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I. Introduction

Q

uestions of legality apart, nations' experience of maritime war zones
or exclusion zones has demonstrated the utility of these juridical!
strategic devices for both offensive and defensive purposes. 1 For example, in
World War I and in World War II both sides created prohibited war zones
for offensive reasons. On the other hand, in the Russo-Japanese War (19041905), the Japanese Government created defensive war zones. 2 Similarly, both
Argentina and the United Kingdom created what each belligerent claimed
to be its defensive war zones in the Falklands ("Malvinas") Islands Conflict
of 1982.3 States declare maritime exclusion zones offensively when they seek
to interdict shipping into a target state or port in order to embargo that
country's trade, especially its trade in war materiel and food. They declare
them defensively when they seek to interdict shipping, or selected types of
shipping (for example, warships and merchant ships carrying military
supplies, or acting as auxiliary naval ships), from entering approaches to the
territory they are defending from invasion.
With regard to offensively-oriented naval exclusion zones, the Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Naval Warfare Publication 9)4
correctly points out that, while the traditional rules of blockade required a
"relatively 'close-in' cordon of surface warships stationed in the immediate
vicinity of the blockaded area,"5 the contemporary development of weapons
and tactics creates a situation which cannot be reconciled with this means
of enforcement. NWP-9 continues:
The so-called long-distance blockade of both World Wars departed materially from
those traditional rules and were justified instead upon the belligerent right of reprisal
against illegal acts of warfare on the part of the enemy.6

NWP-9 also points out the difficulties, indeed, impossibilities, of an inshore blockade in light of modern weapon systems and platforms,
"particularly nuclear-powered submarines, supersonic aircraft, and cruise
missiles. "7
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Without comnuttmg itself as to whether contemporary methods and
weapons for waging war at sea have brought about legal change in the context
of the offensive use of restricted or prohibited war zones, NWP-9 concludes
its discussion of this topic with the observation that:
The [United States] blockade of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports [was]
accomplished by the emplacement of mines, [and] was undertaken in conformity with
traditional criteria of establishment, notification, effectiveness, limitation, and
impartiality.8

While the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors may have observed
some of the traditional, maritime, siege-type, requirements ofblockade,9 and
complied with Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic
Submarine Mines lO it did not entirely meet the traditional requirements of
a close-in blockade since a blockading fleet "within visual range of the coast"l1
was not constantly present outside those ports. Indeed, the system of "MarketTime" (which related only to the coast of South Vietnam) apart, the United
States tended to rely on the air arm as well as on surface warships (under
Operation "Sea Dragon") for purposes of blockading North Vietnam.1 2 Also
the use of floating mines activated by such agencies as sound and vibration
was not in compliance with Hague Convention VIII.
When reviewing the resort to maritime exclusion zones as instruments for
justifying attacks against unarmed merchant ships, this paper will examine
the strategies of the proclaiming states asserting rights to establish such zones.
While both defensively and offensively used exclusion zones are instruments
for logistical strategies,13 that is, strategies directed to the denial of supplies,
reinforcements, and replacements to the enemy, these may be conducted in
terms of either "persisting" and "holding" or alternatively "raiding"
strategies. 14 It will be a further thesis of this paper that to establish maritime
exclusion zones merely for the purpose of implementing raiding strategies,
whereby power is exercised not by the maintenance of control but by
indicating an intention to engage in adventitious attacks on random shipping,
is invalid. In addition, such a strategy involves a politically contradictory
posture. Since the assumptions underlying policies of establishing exclusion
zones include the need for effectiveness and persistence, the fortuitous nature
of zones enforced only by raiding strategies reveal them as being only
haphazardly enforced. Simply to enforce a zone at random times and engage
in random attacks arises from the lack of an essential ratio of power to space
and time which the sufficient mastery of the area and effective exclusion of
the enemy require. Such a result can only be achieved by a persisting strategy.
This calls for an adequate ratio of power to space and time such that control
of the area can be completely assured. In addition to the issues of the strategies
involved (that is, offensive/defensive; logistical!combat; raiding/persisting)
there are, of course, other variables that need to be borne in mind: the
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reasonableness of the zone both in size and in relation to the object(s) the
proclamation( s) seek to achieve; its effectiveness in terms of contemporary
weapons technology; and proportionality both in terms of the ratio of force
to space and time and in terms of enforcement and sanctions.
This chapter will review, first, the legality or illegality of prohibited or
exclusion zones in terms of persisting and raiding strategies, that is, resort
to either or both strategies in order to deny the enemy's access to the economic
resources; and, secondly, in terms of such zones when they are resorted to
for defensive persisting strategies which reflect their use "as a moat defensive
to a house".15 In this latter mode, the commander's object is to exclude the
enemy's shipping from an ocean area on the presumption that the excluded
ships may otherwise attack the state through, or across, the proclaimed zone.
In all cases where these strategie~ are used, the issue of military utility, targets,
and means and methods will be treated as essential to the analysis.
Furthermore, the importance of the principle of distinction and of the
obligation to respect non-participating, neutral shipping, will be stressed. This
final criterion is variable and dependent on a number of factors such as the
geographical location of the zone proclaimed, the density and quantity of the
traffic affected, and the geographical extent of the hostilities.
In the pages that follow a considerable emphasis will be laid on the use
of maritime prohibited zones for purposes of carrying out, or attempting to
carry out, logistical strategies. But, while there are possibly more striking
examples of this (that is, logistical) use of the zones under review, it must
be stressed that the zones are used for defensive and offensive combat
strategies as well. In this latter (combat) connection they can be useful as
adjuncts, rather like the use of mine fields on land or sea by an attacking
force. Their function, in this last scenario, is that of diverting an adversary
into a "killing ground."

II. A Review of State Assertions of Maritime Exclusion
Zones in Times of War or Armed Conflict
A. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05
The investigator today, seeing the proliferation of exclusionary zones in
conflicts which have arisen from very divergent and disparate circumstances,
may be surprised that there was little cavil regarding what has been
denominated as the earliest declaration of such a zone. In the Russo-Japanese
War, 1904-05, Japan established maritime defense zones which Hall described
in the following terms:
Prior to the outbreak of war with Russia, the Japanese Government empowered the
Minister of Marine, or the Commander-in-Chief, ... to designate certain areas
adjacent to the islands of the Japanese Empire as "Defense sea areas." ... On and after
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the outbreak of war twelve or more of such areas were notified, the boundaries of which
in some cases ran as far as ten miles from Iand.1 6

In enforcing these defensive zones by its persisting holding strategy, the
Japanese Government evinced an adequate ratio of force to both time and
space. This effectiveness enabled that country's naval forces to seize and
condemn, as prize of war, the neutral French ship Quang-Nam on the ground
of her presence within the prohibited area.!7 In additio~ to stressing the
historical and legal importance of the Japanese Navy's persistently maintained
and effective defense zones, note should also be taken of the establishment,
in the Russo-Japanese War, of an early forerunner (created by the necessity
of a then contemporary technological innovation of radio) of the 1982 British
Moving Defensive Area (or "Bubble") concept18 for the protection of her
forces in the South Atlantic against both attack and intelligence-gathering.
In the earlier conflict, namely the Russo-Japanese War, the British ship
Haiman had been fitted with a DeForest wireless telegraph apparatus. She
also had a representative of the Times of London on board. Messages were
sent over this apparatus in cypher to Wei-Hai-W ei (at that time a British
possession on the Shantung Peninsula of China and located close to the sea
areas where both belligerents were conducting their naval operations). These
messages were transmitted to London over a neutral cable and thus were
available for newspaper publication.
The Haiman was visited several times by Japanese warships and once by
the Russian cruiser Bayan. She was instructed not to engage in broadcasting
naval operations. Subsequently, however, as a result of the concerns of
Admiral Alexieff, the Russian authorities in the Far East promulgated, on
AprilS, 1904, an instruction to the effect that correspondents broadcasting
within the zone of operations of the Russian fleet should be treated as spies.
The severity of the sanction imposed in the promulgation was adversely
criticized in the British House of Commons. In the House there was general
agreement that the Russian Admiral and the Czar's Viceroy in the Far East
should, rather, have had recourse to the remedies for unneutral service
(confiscation of the ship, her cargo, etc.), rather than accusing and punishing
the offender for the capital crime of espionage19 even if the correspondent
had been found, contrary to the tenets of his profession, to be transmitting
information to the Japanese authorities. It should be noted, however, that
the debate only criticized the threat to resort to the extreme penalty, and
did not question the authority of both fleets to restrict news gathering and
dissemination on the high seas, despite neutrals' expectations that the
belligerents would respect their journalists' right to enjoy those freedoms.
Clearly, the belligerents' encroachments on the neutral states' privileges were
acceptable, provided they remained reasonable and balanced as between the
interests in play. On the other hand, Admiral Alexieff remained unmoved
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by the neutrals' protests. Hence, the Russian position, since it threatened the
extreme sanction of death (probably by hanging),20 rather than the penalty
appropriate for non-neutral service, should be treated as failing the
reasonableness and proportionality tests.
After declaring war on Germany in April 1917, the United States issued
orders similar to the Japanese 1904 regulations. They controlled navigation
in defined areas and around named American ports. These were maintained
by an effective persistent holding and defensive strategy, despite the fact that,
at some points the distance of the circumference of an area from a given center
was as far as ten miles21 (a similar distance to that in the Japanese orders).
Regarding these orders, Hall observed that:
The Japanese and American orders were based on the principle of defense, and it appears
to be on such a principle that claims to establish war zones or areas of the high seas
from which neutrals may be excluded can be supported. The legitimacy in any given
case must be determined by circumstances. 22

Hence it may be asserted that exclusionary zones created purely for
defensive purposes, and provided they are persistently maintained and
rendered effective by virtue of the ratio of power to space and time, and
carry proportionate sanctions for breach, have for some time now, come to
have been approved by the international community. This approval is testified
to by the lack of protest or resistance to both the Japanese and American
proclamations and an agreement among publicists that they fall within the
test of reasonableness.23 But today the types of exclusion zones calling for
legal analysis involve more complex methods and tactics for enforcement,
cover far larger sea areas, and are established for many more diverse ends
than was the case with these early and relatively modest and straightforward
forerunners.

B. World War 1,1914-18 and The Interwar Period
In World Wars I and II prohibited zones were set up by both sides for
the purpose of staging a ruthless and almost effective aggressive logistical
strategy.24 Their objects were to blockade the enemy to.bring him to his knees
by starvation and the denial of war materiel. This is, of course, the complete
opposite of the resort to exclusion zones for defensive purposes by the Japanese
in 1904-05. As has already been pointed out, both of the blockades of World
War I were denounced as illegal by their target (enemy) states. Indeed, while
certain limited forms of maritime exclusion zones have, in recent years, been
increasingly achieving recognition as lawful, in the period of the two World
Wars and the interval between, only those maritime zones which were modest
as to purpose and strictly limited as to area (such as those established by Japan
in 1904 and the United States in 1917) were accepted as lawful. Hence the
German unrestricted submarine warfare in the North Atlantic and the Anglo-
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American "Starvation Blockade" w~re claimed to have been justified by their
executants as constituting appropriate reprisals. Indeed, it should be noted
that the accepted doctrine and practice regarding belligerent reprisals has long
been predicated on the otherwise unlawfulness of the conduct constituting
the reprisaL That conduct becomes justified only by the previous unlawfulness
of the adversary's original act. Despite its intrinsic illegality, the act of reprisal
is claimed to be justified as a sanction against that prior illegal act and becomes
legitimate as a means of putting pressure on the target state to desist from
continuing in its prior unlawful conduct.25
The maritime exclusion zones created by the belligerents started with the
stigma of unlawfulness mitigated only by the previous unlawfulness of the
adversary's conduct giving rise to the drastic response of resorting to reprisals.
Neither party, however, claimed that new weapons and tactics had given rise,
as a matter of necessity, to the emergence of a customary norm justifying
their prohibited zones. Furthermore, each side argued that the other's reprisal
(that is, maritime exclusion zone) was illegal even as a reprisaL26 In addition,
an assertion of customary international law justification would, most
probably, have been met with outrage and derision by the neutral states
(which, down to April 2, 1917, included the United States of America). But
the purpose of this chapter is to learn whether, since 1918, subjects of the
international legal order have come to recognize, as customary international
law, and aside from the very questionable arguments based on reprisals, at
least some maritime prohibited zones which are established in time of war.
Such an inquiry calls for the substantiation of criteria for establishing the
validity of certain of these tactical and strategic devices. The point of referring
to justifications predicated on reprisals was to indicate merely that neither
party, and especially the United Kingdom, was prepared to risk that its policy,
if failing the test of legality on the basis of the emergence of a customary
norm, would draw upon itself the stigma of illegal conduct based on a spurious
argument. But nowadays such arguments in terms of reprisals are, in light
of emerging customary norms, largely anachronistic.
(1) Traditional Blockade-A Time-Honored Logistical Strategy
Revisiting the older and well established rules, the investigation which
follows will begin with reviewing the legal institution of blockade as it had
evolved over some two centuries previous to World War I, and had been
defined, in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, by treaty.
Originally, the requirement was that a blockade to be valid and opposable
to neutral shipping, had to be "close-in and, of course, persisting in terms
of the necessary ratio of force to space and time." While weapons did not
render such a blockade suicidal (as today's military arsenal clearly would),
it was, in the heyday of sail, not without considerable risks and challenges
to the blockading commanders. This is illustrated in a British naval historian's
review of the "close-in" blockade of Brest during the French Revolutionary
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and Napoleonic Wars reflecting as it did both a persisting holding strategy
and a necessary ratio of force to space and time:
Brest, where the principal fleet of the French was lying, commanded by Admiral
Ganteaume is in the north-east corner of the Bay. Outside it is a rocky coast and a
wicked stretch ofsea, foggy, cold and stormy. Strong tides set through the narrow sounds
inside the Isle ofUshant, and the prevailing wind, southwesterly, blows onshore with
the whole of the open Atlantic behind it to build up a sea and swell. Even the sailing
ships of modern times, such as they are, are advised to keep well offshore. Collingwood,
who commanded the blockade in the '90s, had said that this coast was more dangerous
than a battle once a week.
Yet to keep the approaches to Brest under observation, Collingwood had to be close.
Ships of the line in those days were unhandy vessels, slow to windward and slow to
go about. Embayed on a lee shore with an incoming swell, they could never be sure
of clawing off again. Caught in a calm, they were helpless against a tide that might
set them into unnavigable sounds. Yet night and day, summer and winter, Collingwood
and his captains stood off and on that shore, estimating the tidal streams and currents,
constantly solving the problems of navigation and ship-handling-and not merely in
a single ship, but in a whole fleet of them. No modern sailor would dare to explain
how they did it; the art of sailing such ships is long forgotten. Even then, the achievement
amazed the French, who looked out in every dawn and saw the sails there. There was
only a single exception. In heavy westerly gales, they ran for shelter in Plymouth Sound,
a hundred and fifty miles across the Channel-because in a westerly gale, the French
could not possibly beat out of harbour. But whenever the wind showed signs of
moderating, they were back on station before the French could stir. 27

But severe a challenge as the risks of winds, waves, tides and rocks were
in the days of sail, they challenged, to a very high degree, proficiency in
seamanship. They did not partake of the same order of inevitable
destructiveness that would be the result if ships were to engage in a "closein" blockade today, when modem-day airborne and submarine radardirected, heat-seeking missiles, or other forms of the "smart" weapons of
contemporary arsenals would doom the enterprise. The destruction wrought
on H.M.S. Sheffield by an Exocet missile (even though the ship was not engaged
in any "close-in" blockade) during the 1982 Falklands Conflict illustrates the
vulnerability of modem warships to even rather obsolescent, cheap and easily
made post-World War II missile-type weapons. Furthermore, the sad error
of U.S.S. Vincennes inJuly 1988 underscores the difficulties of command that
modem weaponry can create. (Although the Vincennes was not involved in
an official blockade, she was operating in a populous and geographically
restricted area with busy air and sea lanes. The incident illustrates the
technological!moral!and social problems with which a commander in a closein blockade situation of today would be faced.) Finally, it is suggested that
a persisting effective blockade, reflecting an adequate ratio of force to both
space and time, can be achieved without literally complying with the
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nineteenth and earlier centuries' criterion for effectiveness of being "close. "
m.
Again, technology has changed the exercise of the right of visit and search
quite basically, as McDougal and Feliciano have pointed out regarding the
present-day difficulties:
It scarcely needs demonstration to show that the successful exercise of these procedures
at sea, in the context of modem naval and air warfare, presents the most formidable
difficulties. The warship attempting to stop, board and search a suspected enemy or
neutral vessel becomes, in the course of such an attempt, highly vulnerable to air and
submarine attack. Moreover, the size of present-day ocean carriers and the volume of
cargo carried make any inspection of the cargo that goes beyond the perfunctory
examination of shipping manifests practically impossible without modem dock
facilities. 28

The authors argue, accordingly, that the practice of diverting suspected
merchantmen to designated control points that has arisen in response to the
challenge that the foregoing difficulties have posed, is reasonable and hence
valid. They argue, further, that the same rationale applies to the diversion
of suspect vessels before or without the formality of a boarding to effect the
visit and search on the high seas.29
In comparison, the 1856 Declaration of Paris authoritatively asserted that
a state, to ensure that its blockade was valid and opposable to neutral ships
captured as prizes of war for breaching the blockade, was obliged to ensure
that its blockade was "really effective."3O This obligation was repeated in
the Declaration of London, 1909,31 which, however, was never ratified by
Great Britain and never entered into force as a binding instrument for any
of the states that negotiated it. But a number of countries did evince
considerable sentiment in favor of its terms, as exemplified, for example, by
the United States' proposal in August 1914 that the belligerents comply with
it. The Entente Powers found, on analysis, however, that Germany and
Austria could import unlimited quantities of foodstuffs and other conditional
contraband through the neutral state of the Netherlands (which took the view
that the combination of her declaration of neutrality, together with the
Convention of Mannheim of 1868 regulating the navigation of the Rhine,
completely tied her hands).
On the other hand, article 34 of the Declaration would permit an enemy
of the United Kingdom to stop all exportation of food from a neutral state
to that country. Indeed, it was prior to the outbreak of the First World War
that intense public agitation in Great Britain against, inter alia, article 34, that
had created so great an opposition to that country's signature, that it resulted
in the United Kingdom Government's reversal of its position on the
Declaration and in its refusal to ratify the agreement. 32
This very serious departure by Great Britain and France in their statements
of policy in August 191433 from the principles of the unratified convention
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provided Imperial Germany with the basis for her claim to engage in her
"long distance blockade" by means of indiscriminate submarine warfare, and
of mining the approaches to the British Isles. The German submarine policies
were stated to be reprisals against the British and French rejection of the
1909 Declaration. 34 In reality the German submarine logistical strategy, which
began with a smaller submarine fleet, in 1914, than that of the United Kingdom
(28 for Germany and 56 for Great Britain) at the outbreak of war,35 never
ceased, despite the concentration of her naval effort on submarine warfare,
to be a raiding logistical strategy carried out, even at its height of success
(March-August 191736) by random attacks that were no better than raiding
assaults and never could be effectively sustained by maintaining an adequate
ratio of force to space and time.
Contrariwise, the Entente Powers, on November 4, 1914, justified their
long distance blockade, not as a legally permitted logistical strategy, but only
on the basis of their claim to resort to belligerent reprisals-namely in
retaliation for Germany's sowing contact mines in the open sea around the
British Isles contrary to the Hague Mining Convention {Convention VIII).37
On the other hand, an alternative basis to the questionable one of belligerent
reprisals might have been supported in terms of an emerging customary rule.
The case for the Entente Powers' long distance blockade might have been
argued in terms of the geographical expansion of the blockade owing to
emerging technological exigencies coupled with a demonstration of its still
being "truly effective," just as was the "close-in" blockade of the age of
sail. Such a blockade could be shown to constitute a persisting logistical
strategy with an adequate ratio of force to space and time. Hence it was
effective within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the 1856 Paris Convention.38
(2) The Test of "Effectiveness"
Although becoming increasingly anachronistic, given changes in weapons
technology, the test of effectiveness was seen, for example, in the diplomatic
exchanges during World War I down to April 1917, as a term of art deriving
from the Paris and other Declarations and international agreements. Hence,
effectiveness was frequently represented as requiring the positioning of a
naval force on station, so that it prevented access into and egress from the
zone (port, estuary, coast, etc.) blockaded. It was out of this requirement,
in a time before radar, radio, aircraft, and submarines, that the notion
developed that the test of "effectiveness" could call for a cordon of anchored
men-of-war. But, as the experience of World War I showed, an effective
blockade could be maintained at a considerable distance from the enemy's
ports. For example, the Anglo-American mine barrier across the northern
end of the North Sea provided as effective a blockade as did the presence
of the British Grand Fleet in Scapa Flow to bottle up the German High Seas
Fleet in the Jade River.
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If conduct which was regarded as impermissible becomes viewed as legally
permissible, a new regime of customary international law must be shown to
have come into being; provided that the twin requirements of a constant and
"uniform usage practiced by the states in question, and that this usage is the
expression of a right ... "39 are satisfied. In the case of a change in the
detonations of the qualifier, "effective," such a new customary rule may well
be justified on the basis of the confrontation of the reality of the new
technology with traditional law, rendering obsolete the old rule of a closein stationing of the blockading fleet. New situations and new weapons,
through necessity, may be shown to have given rise to new practices that
still satisfy the requirement of effectiveness, whose connotation remains
unchanged; that is, it satisfies the requirement of being a persisting holding
logistical strategy. In these circumstances necessity reinforces the mental
element of determining the emergence of a customary rule. But, despite the
resort by both sides in World War I to systems of prohibited zones in which
neutral merchant ships would be controlled on the British and French side
by surface forces (with an ever-increasing list of contraband being used to
justify their seizure) and, on the other, by the threat of being sunk on sight,
by the end of that war there was no consensus leading to any recognition
of prohibited maritime zones as lawful. Indeed, a great negative reaction had
set in, and while the British "Starvation Blockade" was widely denounced
by publicists (and especially German scholars writing on the subject), the
German indiscriminate submarine warfare was even more widely stigmatized
for its ruthless inhumanity.
The diplomatic interventions of the United States, prior to her declaration
of war (April 2, 1917) against Germany in World War I, both in terms of
her suggestions and proposals to both belligerents, and in terms of the
diplomatic protests she lodged with both sides, are of considerable interest
in evaluating the possibility of the emergence of a customary international
norm. It is also germane to arguments that contemporary diplomacy operated
with a strong negative impact on such a possible development.
On August 6, 1914, the United States proposed to both of the belligerent
coalitions that they should adopt the Declaration of London of 1909 as it stood.
The Entente {in effect Great Britain and France)40 announced that they would
apply the Declaration, but with very serious departures from it regarding
conditional contraband. Germany, on the other hand, notified the United
States on August 22, 1914, that she was willing to apply the Declaration of
London in its entirety.41 On receipt of these replies the United States protested
vigorously against the British Order in Council of August 20, 1914. Thus,
on October 30, 1914, the August 20 Order in Council was cancelled and
replaced by a further promulgation, making important concessions to the
United States. But, on December 26, 1914, the United States made a further
vigorous protest. While these early exchanges did not relate to "long distance
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blockades" as such, they were soon followed up by United States proposals
against that form of Allied control of neutral shipping suspected of trading
with the Central Powers. On December 28, 1914, the United States became
the spokesman of neutral powers and again protested against the systematic
enforcement of the diversions of neutral ships which were required by the
Entente's economic measures. The United States argued that those systematic
diversions were tantamount to a general presumption that all diverted ships
were carrying contraband, and that such a presumption was contrary to
international law.
Taking advantage of the neutrals' angry reaction to the Entente's system
of diverting neutral shipping, and the Allies' rejection of the key articles of
the Declaration of London of 1909 (for example article 34), Germany on
February 18, 1915, promulgated her first declaration of indiscriminate
submarine warfare. She claimed that this form of warfare was permissible
as a reprisal against the Entente's refusal to abide by the Declaration of London
and their systematic deviation of neutral shipping. She declared that any
hostile merchant ship encountered in British or Irish waters, including the
English Channel, would be sunk without warning. Neutral ships navigating
in those waters were stated to be at risk, on the ground that merchant ships
of the Entente had, on several occasions, hoisted neutral colors and "mistakes
could not be avoided. "42
(3) The Effect of the United States Entry into World War I
In response to the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare
in early 1915 the United Kingdom proclaimed the Order in Council of March
11, 1915 (which was followed by the French decree of March 11, 1915).
Regarding those promulgations, Guichard tells us that:
Up to that date indeed France and England had confined their attention to contraband
alone; from 11th March 1915 they held themselves free to bring into their ports any
goods the destination, ownership, or origin of which was presumed to be hostile. In
other words all direct trade between Germany and the Powers overseas was put a stop
to.43

Originally, this Order-in-Council was applied only to sea areas east of the
15th degree east longitude and north of the 30th degree north latitude.
Subsequently this zone was extended to sea areas east of the 30th degree west
longitude. In effect, despite British and French insistence to the contrary, they
had, in effect, created a maritime prohibited zone in relation to neutral vessels
that they (the Entente Powers) believed to be trading with, or carrying goods
to and from, the Central Powers. 44 Furthermore, they were able to maintain
this logistical strategy with a persisting ability to hold the area and maintain
it effectively.
In March, April, and July 1915 the United States, in effect, charged the
Entente Powers with illegally interfering with neutral commerce. On
October 21, 1915, this country protested strongly against the steps that the
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Entente Powers had taken to interdict neutral trade with the Central
Powers. 45 On July 7, 1916, moreover, the Entente Powers, over France's
misgivings, abandoned their voluntary acceptance of the principles of the
Declaration of London. But the period of United States' protests against the
Entente Powers' blockade ended after her entry, on April 2, 1917, into World
War 1. Indeed this country brought a much needed, added, strength and
guiding force to the Allies' blockade. Guichard tells us that:
The attempts made to bring unity of direction between France. Great Britain and
Italy had hitherto been unsuccessful .... Unity of direction which France had early
asked for and which had been so conspicuously lacking was forced upon the allies by
the economic policy of the United States....
. . . . However just about the time that inter-Allied cooperation in the economic war
really became effective the blockade ceased to occupy the first place in the economic
anxieties of the Allies. The German counter-blockade ...• [their] achieved unity of
action ... in respect of maritime transport•... [gave] them victory in the economic
war. 46

In the period 1914-17, and prior to the United States' entry into World
War I, the Allied long distance blockade was in an evolving process. During
that period it was the subject of diplomatic protests by the United States and
other neutral countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and
Sweden. This latter group, consisting of minor powers having Germany as
their neighbor, provided an economic protective arc around northern
Germany. Their economic significance for Germany was greatly enhanced,
as has already been noted, by the implications of the Declaration of London
of 1909,47 had the Entente Powers accepted the 1914 United States proposal
to that effect. 48 While they supported the United States' position down to
April 2, 1917, the Dutch and Scandinavian neutrals negotiated with the Allies
prior to that date to ameliorate the impact of the blockade upon them in
consideration for their limiting their exports to Germany.
In reviewing the relations between the United States and the Entente
Powers retrospectively from April 2, 1917, and comparing them,
prospectively, with the United States' attitude after the German Emperor's
second order of unrestricted submarine warfare on January 19, 1917, it must
be said that the United States had a complete change of heart regarding the
matter of the Entente's policy of imposing the long-distance blockade. Just
prior to April 2, 1917, the United States' attitude toward Germany had been
exacerbated by the German proposal to Mexico and Japan that they enter
into an alliance against the United States (published on March 1, 1917).49 With
regard to the United States' wholehearted and energetic participation in the
Allies' blockade of Germany and its reflecting a complete change of heart,
Guichard wrote, regarding earlier American attitudes, "it is of course quite
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true that in August 1914 the United States had exchanged some very tart notes
with the Allies on the subject of economic war.... "50
After April 2, 1917, under the added pressure from the United States, the
neutral states' adhesion to the Entente's economic policies became a matter
of increased necessity. In addition, as a result of her economic pressures and
deprivations, and of her sense of triumph as a result of her imposition of the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on a prostrate Communist Russia,51 Germany
increased her demands, especially on the Netherlands. This had the result of
European neutrals becoming more accommodating to the Allied and
Associated Powers. Indeed, the famous affair of the "Dutch Convoy" in
April-June 1918 clearly illustrated the Netherlands' acceptance of the Allied
long distance blockade of Germany then in force. 52 The fact of the United
States' participation in the long-distance blockade was all-important to the
Netherlands' position. Without it her capacity to resist German demands
would have been nil.

c.

World War II, 1939-45
By contrast with the neutral protests, prior to April 2, 1917, against the
Entente Powers' long distance blockade in World War I, the United States
did not take a similarly adversarial position with respect to the Allied Powers'
blockade of Germany in World War II. On the other hand, both the United
States and the Soviet Union reserved their rights to claim compensation for
possible future losses due to the Allied Powers' enforcement of their blockade.
Such possible claims for compensation do not necessarily indicate
compensation for denials of the other party's rights, but only that the Allies
should pay for injuries to persons or property incidentally inflicted in the
exercise of their blockade rights. After some three months into World War
II, Great Britain and France reinstated what were, in effect, the principles
of their long-distance blockade of World War I. Thus, after waiting for
approximately three months, Great Britain promulgated her Order-inCouncil of November 27, 1939.53 Other neutrals, for example, Italy,
protested.54 After Italy entered the war on June 11, 1940, the system was
extended to her.55 While the Scandinavian countries also lodged protests early
in the war, events overcame their positions after Germany invaded and
occupied Norway and Denmark and effectively held Sweden in a
hammerlock.
Again, as in World War I, Great Britain justified her long distance blockade
as a "retaliatory system." Additionally, in World War II, Great Britain felt
her position regarding reprisals to be strengthened by the facts of Germany's
violation of the London (Submarine) Protocol of 1936, her breach of Hague
Convention VIII on minelaying, and her indiscriminate destruction of
seaborne commerce between the Allies and neutral states. After Italy's entry
into the War, Great Britain asserted the same right of reprisal against Italy
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as against Germany-on the ground of Italy's becoming associated with
German methods of warfare. 56 It should be noted that while British and proBritish jurists and commentators were already discussing the idea of a long
distance blockade, and were asserting that "Britain could not be expected
to fight another war without resort to"57 that form of economic warfare,
the United Kingdom did not rely on any notion that such a system had emerged
as a separate category in the customary international law of war. Instead,
she merely had recourse, once more, to her "retaliatory system." Her caution
in this regard was, of course, largely due to her uncertainty about the attitudes
of the United States and the Soviet Union and her policy of not encouraging
those countries to challenge her system in the name of the freedom of the
high seas. This delicacy was further motivated by the sobering realization
of the strength of isolationism in the United States and the violent reversal
of Soviet foreign policy to a much more pro-German stance, as evidenced
by the fall of Litvinoff and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact
of August 1939, the Soviet partition of Poland with Germany, and the Soviet
seizure of the Baltic States, as an outcome ofJoseph Stalin's new pro-German
orientation.
In comparing the diplomatic protests served against the Entente Powers
regarding their long range blockades in Wodd War I with those issued in
World War II, there would appear to be, quantitatively and qualitatively,
a considerable decline, on the part of the neutral states, in their resorting
to this form of resisting or rejecting the Allies' retaliatory system. This raises
the question of whether decreased reliance on strong diplomatic protests in
World War II as compared to World War I, may arguably be seen as the
beginning of an acknowledgment, albeit reluctant, of their decreasing utility
and necessity. But, again in World War II, as in World War I, the factors
leading to the emergence of a customary international law norm justifying
the long-distance blockades were camouflaged by both sides' invocations of
reprisal as justification for their actions.

D. Review of Developments Through World Wars I and II, and the Interwar
Period
To whatever extent decisions of international tribunals, or of domestic
tribunals applying international law, have credibility, the decisional law has
thrown an ambiguous light on the issue of the acceptance of such zones.
First, it should be noted that the United Nations War Crimes Commission
did not address the question of blockade by resort to aerial attacks on shipping.
Aircraft, clearly, have limitations similar to those of submarines regarding
any capability to visit, search, and seize ships. Possibly this omission could
be explained by the fact that the Allied forces engaged in this activity to
a greater extent than did the Axis Powers, largely due to their very much
greater preponderance in the air.58
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But the question must be asked whether the fact of non-prosecution at
Nuremberg for the indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships by aircraft was
due simply to the fact that the United Nations had themselves engaged in
this activity in World War II, knowing it to be illegal, and the United Nations
prosecutors did not wish to have the conduct of their own military planners
stigmatized as war crimes? Or, alternatively, did they so plan their cases
because they had felt that long distance blockades had become lawful through
general practice and acceptance and, further, because such blockades could
lawfully be enforced by aircraft notwithstanding its limitations with regard
to ensuring the safety of target ships' papers, passengers, and crews?
The records of the Nuremberg proceedings regarding prosecution for the
indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships by submarines to enforce maritime
prohibited zones as war crimes are instructive. Although Admiral Doenitz
was charged before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg with
waging unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the London Naval Treaty
of 193059 and the 1936 Naval Protocol60 (to which Germany had acceded),
and although evidence was shown that, on September 3, 1939, the German
U-boat arm began unrestricted submarine warfare, the Tribunal was not
prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of that form of submarine
warfare against British armed merchant ships. In addition, after receiving
evidence of British unrestricted submarine warfare in a maritime prohibited
zone which the United Kingdom had established, namely the Skagerrak,
following a British Admiralty announcement of May 8,1940, and after noting
Admiral Nimitz's answers to interrogatories which showed that the United
States Navy had begun unrestricted submarine warfare against the Japanese
in the Pacific Ocean immediately following the surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Tribunal announced that its sentence of
Doenitz was not assessed on the ground of his "breaches of the international
law of submarine warfare. "61 Thus the British diplomatic campaign, during
the inter-War period, to outlaw the type of submarine warfare 62 to which
the German Empire resorted in World War I, was not revived after World
War II. It should be noted that while the British exclusionary zone in World
War II was comparatively modest, being constituted by an arm of the North
Sea, the Skagerrak,63 the United States had declared the whole of the Pacific
Ocean (one third of the Earth's surface) a prohibited zone in which Japanese
ships, both naval and mercantile, would be sunk without warning.
Finally, it should also be noted that some aggravated types of submarine
attacks on civilian shipping in both World Wars were punished as war crimes.
But these always involved conduct that was more reprehensible than merely
that act of sinking the victim ship without warning. The war crimes cases
arising from both World Wars that spring to mind illustrate the types of
aggravated circumstances giving rise to the charges. These cases are:
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(1) The Llandovery Castle (World War 1):64 Submerged submarine Uboat 82 sank a hospital ship which was distinctly marked as such. The hospital
ship was not carrying any military personnel other than sick and wounded
soldiers and members of the Canadian Medical Corps. After torpedoing the
hospital ship, the submarine's commander, one Patzig, ordered the U-boat
to surface and, after questioning some of the survivors, fired on the survivQrs
in lifeboats, massacring many of them. After the War Patzig was not found,
but two of his officers were arrested, tried and convicted of their war crimes.
The plea of superior orders was rejected because "killing defenceless people
in life-boats could be nothing else but a breach of the law;"65
(2) The Peleus (World War II): The submarine commander ordered the
massacre by machine-gun fire of the survivors who were clinging to pieces
of wreckage from the sunken merchant ship;66
(3) Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle (World War II): As in The Peieus, the
accused had ordered the massacre of survivors of sunken ships and was
convicted for that aggravated offense;"67
(4) Trial of Helmuth von Ruchtesschell (World War II):68 The accused
was the commander of an armed German surface raider. He was charged
with committing, inter alia, the following offenses against Allied merchant
ships: (a) continuing to fire after the target ship had signalled her surrender;
(b) failure to make provision for the safety of survivors (despite having the
facilities for taking prisoners on board his ship); and (c) firing at survivors
in life rafts. 69
E. The Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, 1982
In each of two conflicts fought in the present decade, namely the Falkland
Islands Conflict (1982)7° and the Persian Gulf Tanker War (1982-1988),71 both
sides promulgated Maritime Exclusion Zones. But their various definitions
and uses have been very different. In the 1982 Falkland Islands Conflict a
number of exclusion zones (seven in all) were proclaimed. The British
declarations and the first two Argentinian zones reflected the desire of both
sides to limit the conflict to the combat forces that they had committed to
the struggle, to the Islands, and to the seas around them. The British resort
to maritime exclusion zones was to further their persisting combat strategy
of retaking and defending the Islands. Their persisting strategy was, in part,
executed by raiding combat tactics. On the other hand, the Argentinian
invocation of such zones (except her third, her May 11, 1982, proclamation
of a "South Atlantic War Zone")72 was for the purpose of reinforcing her
persisting tactics once her raiding strategy had netted her control over the
Falkl~nd Islands. This appeared to be a corollary of the claim that each of
the parties asserted, namely that it was merely exercising its right of selfdefense, and was limiting its use of force to expelling its adversary from the
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Islands, or to preventing that adversary from permanently establishing its
territorial sovereignty over them.
The first British announcement of a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ), took
effect on April 12, 1982. It established the prohibited area as being two
hundred nautical miles radius from a point approximately at the center of
the Falkland Islands. Under this promulgation only Argentine warships and
naval auxiliaries found within this zone were liable to be attacked.73 On the
following day Argentina responded by establishing a two hundred sea-mile
zone off its coast and around the "Malvinas" (Falkland) Islands. Since the
British fleet was still some distance from the Islands, the effectiveness, for
the first week or so, of the declaration of the British Maritime Exclusion
Zone had the effect, as a ruse of war, of reinforcing an unfounded Argentine
belief that the Royal Naval nuclear submarine H.M.S. Superb was on station
in the area of Puerto Belgrano and the Falklands. The fact that Superb was
at Holy Loch, Scotland, at the time may give rise to the question whether
the British "blockade" complied with the Declaration ofParis.74 On this point
Professor Levie has commented:
The British declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels
were not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy naval vessels. It
was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to Argentine naval forces. 75

On April 23, 1982, the United Kingdom Government informed the
Argentine Government that:
Any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries
or military aircraft, which could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of
the British forces in the South Atlantic, will encounter the appropriate response. All
Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaged in surveillance of these British forces,
will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.76

The zone enunciated in this second declaration has been referred to
as "The Defensive Bubble." The Royal Navy, the British public and,
indeed, the world, did not have long to wait to see this proclaimed
"Defensive Bubble" put into lethal effect. On May 2, 1982, the British
submarine Conqueror torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General
Be/grano some thirty miles outside the MEZ around the Falkland Islands.
As a result, the British Government experienced some criticism in
Parliament and in both the domestic and foreign press. In Parliament
the responsible Minister (Mr. Nott) responded by pointing out that:
That zone [that is, the MEZ proclaimed on April 12, 1982] is not relevant in this case.
The "General Belgrano" was attacked under the terms of our warning to the Argentines
some 10 days previously that any Argentine naval vessel or military aircraft which could
amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic
would encounter the appropriate response.77
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On April 28, 1982 the British Government announced its Total Exclusion
Zone (TEZ),78 to take effect on April 30, 1982. While occupying the same
area as the MEZ of April 12, this zone also encompassed "any ... aircraft,
whether military or civil which is operating in support of the illegal
occupation" of the Falkland Islands. 79 It continued with the further warning
that:
Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within this zone
without due authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded as
operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as
hostile ....80

Finally, it should be noted that in all her announcements of the delimitations
of her specific zones Great Britain still continued to insist that they were
without prejudice to her general right of self-defense under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. This provided a further legal justification for the
sinking of the General Belgrano. Criticism of that attack may be further seen
as paradoxical considering that, at the time of the sinking, the Argentinian
forces were occupying the Islands and the British forces were forcibly
attempting to terminate that possession.
The United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense announced an important policy
statement on May 7,1982, when it said that, because hostile forces "can cover,
undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather, "81 the distances involved
in resupplying the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands, or take other
hostile action, "any Argentine warship or military aircraft which are found
more than 12 miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as hostile. "82
The Soviet Union, without protesting the creation of an exclusion zone in
principle, advised the British government that it considered the latest
statement of policy unlawful, "because it 'arbitrarily proclaim[ed] vast
expanses of high seas closed to ships and craft of other countries.' "83 On this
Professor Levie has commented:
Of course, a blockade always denies the use of part of the high seas to other countries.
While the Soviet Union might have questioned the extent of the blockaded area as
excessive, if the blockade was effective (and there seems little doubt that it was), it
was a valid blockade under the 1856 Declaration of Paris, to which Russia was one of
the original parties.54

On the other hand, if the Soviet criticism is directed against the
proclamation on the basis of its ineffectiveness due to an insufficient ratio
of force to space, a point not answered in Professor Levie's comment, it would
appear to be factually inaccurate. Adequate force appeared to be present
wherever needed to carry out the enforcement of the British maritime
exclusion zones for effectuating that country's logistical strategy.
Furthermore, the area was not so vast as to be unmanageable in fact, and
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the proclamation appeared to have been enforced by persisting holding, rather
than raiding, tactics.
After the Argentine forces on the Falkland Islands had surrendered, Great
Britain lifted the Total Exclusion Zone Ouly 22,1982), but, at the same time,
asked the Argentine Government (via the Swiss Government) not to allow
its military aircraft or warships within a zone measuring 150 sea miles radius
around the Falkland Islands. Similarly Argentina was warned not to allow
her civil aircraft and shipping within that zone without the prior agreement
of the British Government.
In response to the British MEZ on April 8, 1982, Argentina proclaimed
a similar Maritime Zone, and, on April 29, 1982, it strengthened its MEZ.
Finally it proclaimed, on May 11,1982, a "South Atlantic War Zone." This
last declaration has been the occasion of well-known litigation. In Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine RepublicS5 the plaintiff corporation sued
Argentina for the loss of its very large oil tanker Hercules as a result of three
successive air strikes by Argentine aircraft using bombs and air-to-surface
missiles. At the time of the attack the Hercules was "about 600 miles off the
Argentine coast and nearly 500 miles from the Falkland Islands. "86 The court
added that she was "in international waters, well outside the "exclusion
zones" declared by the warring parties."87
While that statement would have been true if it had referred to the British
zones and those declared by Argentina on April 8 and April 29, 1982, it was
of doubtful accuracy with regard to Argentina's "South Atlantic War Zone"
which that country declared on May 11, 1982. It is a valid inference, therefore,
that the court may have been prepared to recognize Argentina's first two
declarations as creating valld exclusion zones, but it was not prepared to
extend that recognition to the vaguely defined "South Atlantic War Zone. "88
Indeed, this last zone, regardless of the bombing of the Hercules, fails the tests
of reasonableness, proportionality, clarity of definition, and self-defense. It
merely proclaimed the basis for a random, raiding logistical strategy. It clearly
failed to provide for an adequate ratio of power to space and time, and
amounted to little more than an excuse for conducting indiscriminate attacks
on neutral shipping, rather than formulating an effective logistical, persisting,
holding strategy which could be integrated in a sea-keeping assertion of naval
power utilized for rational ends.

F. The Persian Gulf "Tanker War" 1980-1988
Although the Iraq-Iran war began with the border clashes inJune-August
1980, leading to full-scale land fighting on September 21,1980,89 the Persian
Gulf Tanker War, as a specific logistical strategy in an array of means and
methods for conducting hostilities in the Gulf, may be said to have begun
with the Iraqi declaration on August 12, 1982, of a prohibited war zone
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at the northern end of the Persian Gulf (north of 29° 03' North). 90 In contrast
with the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict, which took place in an unfrequented
and secluded part of the world, the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf is one of the
world's busiest waterways. The original (August 12, 1982) Iraqi prohibited
war zone contained the northern end of the Gulf. In reality, however, this
zone was not so much one of exclusion, supported by a persisting logistical
strategy, as the proclamation of an intention to engage, as opportunities
offered, in random air raids to inhibit Iranian shipping in the Gulf.
Subsequently, the zone's area was enlarged so as to include the key Iranian
oil installations on Kharg Island. In February 1984, this was expanded to
include a 50-mile radius around Kharg. Until early in 1984 the Iraqis
concentrated their attacks on ships navigating in the northern zone and
sailing to and from Bandar Khomeini and Bandar Manshar. But after early
1984 they concentrated their air strikes on ships sailing to and from Kharg.
The Iraqi logistical strategy was clear. Like Napoleon's Berlin and Milan
Decrees against Great Britain (which were directed against British trade and
that country's ability to wage war and subsidize her allies from her income
from that trade), the object of the raids was to deny Iran the income she
needed from oil exports in order to purchase war materiel abroad and,
generally, defray her costs of waging the war.
Iran had a similar logistical end in view, namely that of suppressing her
enemy's trade with third countries which enabled Iraq to earn the money
needed in order to defray her cost of waging the war. This prevention of
trade was executed by means of interdicting all and any navigation to and
from Iraqi ports in the Gulf. But Iraq was able to export her oil, and so defray
the costs of her belligerency, by pipelines across her western and southern
neighbors. In addition, Iran also established prohibited zones off the shores
of Iraq's backers in the war, for example, Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates, in the hope of reducing their oil revenues and hence their
contributions to Iraq's war effort through limiting her purchasing power on
~he world arms markets.
Responses to Iranian attacks launched in support of this policy>included
the United States policy of reflagging Kuwaiti tankers, establishing convoys
with United States, British, French, and Italian escorts, and bringing the
issue of the unlawful interference with neutral flag shipping to the attention
of the Security Council of the United Nations. All these steps did not
prevent continued Iranian raids on neutral flag tankers. Nor, indeed, did
the Saudi Arabian proclamation of a 12-mile safety corridor which, since
it was within the territorial seas of the seven states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, was entitled to belligerent respect, and was intended to provide
security for neutral shipping-especially the very large tankers carrying
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oil from Kuwait and from other supporters ofIraq. But this raised no legal
issues regarding its validity as a maritime zone, since it merely created a
right-of-way for neutral ships in neutral states' territorial waters.
The legal issues involving the Iraqi and Iranian exclusion zones, and the
attacks on shipping therein, depended very largely on the reasons for those
promulgations. Clearly they were not promulgated, as were the Japanese
proclamations of 1904 and those of the United States of 1917, for purposes
of self-defense, nor for the furtherance of persisting or holding strategies.
They were announced for purposes of inhibiting shipping in the Gulf from
engaging in the oil export trade of each belligerent's adversaries and their
supporters by means of random attacks. They reflected offensive raiding
strategies having only adventitious impacts on possible target shipping.
Similar to the experience in World Wars I and II, especially early in
World War I when neutral shipping was attacked, the neutral states
protested and denounced the attackers. In contrast to those earlier conflicts
however, it should b~ noted that both Iran and Iraq made neutral ships their
main targets. Furthermore, Iran not only attacked neutral shipping which
may have been suspected of earning revenues, either directly or indirectly,
for Iraq, but also neutral ships when they were navigating between neutral
ports or even fishing in the Gulf. This, indeed, places the Iranian policy
well beyond what may possibly be seen as defensible by supporters of an
emerging customary international law permitting the establishment of
effective exclusionary zones maintained persistently by an adequate ratio
of power to space and time. Even when satisfying these criteria, such a
zone may be lawful only if it is, comparatively speaking, maintained
effectively and complies with the rule of reasonableness. It may not provide
an excuse for a raiding strategy directed randomly against any or all nonIranian shipping found in the Zone without regard to their nationality or
to their purpose for being in the Zone.
There is a further consideration: Although the belligerents have not been
subjected to the severe and hostile criticism that may have been expected,
or that was the experience of the belligerents in World War I, the neutral
states' muted outrage may not be due to their tacit acceptance of a new
customary rule exposing them to random, raiding attacks. Rather, their
relative silence may be attributed to the fact that the very large tanker surplus
fleet (and threat of an oil surplus as well) and the favorable conditions of
insurance in the 1980's rendered such attacks relatively less unacceptable to
the tanker fleets' owners than did such attacks during the World Wars, when
they resulted in a great scarcity both of shipping and of the cargoes those
sunken ships had carried.
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III. Review of Some Relevant Concepts Relating
to the Emergence of Customary
Principles of International Law
Governing the Establishment of Maritime Exclusion
Zones in the Context of the
Resort to the Use of Force
A. Custom and the Emergence of Belligerent Maritime Usages and Obligatory
Rules
Customary international law is formed from a combination of ·"a constant
and uniform usage practised by the States in question"91 and the essential
psychological element of opinio juris sive necessitatis. 92 Because, for so long
maritime states have stressed, as fundamental to their survival, the freedom
of the high seas, belligerents' claims to enforce maritime exclusion zones must
be carefully balanced against the traditional and basal doctrine and the
interests interpreting it. Assertions that the power to create such zones has
emerged into customary international law demand rigorous criteria for
justifying their promulgation by warring states. Indeed, a. case-by-case
approach is required. On the other hand, it should be observed that the
creation of such zones has arisen, in part, from the development and
deployment of new weapons, from the evolution of new tactics, and from
the emergence of economic warfare as an important, indeed essential,
weapon. Thus, they have been resorted to for the purposes of both combat
and logistical strategies.
The dual essentials of usage and the actor's belief in the right or necessity
of acting in the prescribed manner hold equal sway as criteria for determining
the emergence of a customary law doctrine orprivilege.93 Furthermore, when
these are consistent with the fundamental right of self-defense, and satisfy
the rule of reasonableness, their potential interference with a neutral state's
traditional rights under the freedom of the high seas may be justified. On
the other hand, if they are implemented by raiding strategies, even if for the
purpose of self-defense and even if they may satisfy the criteria of
proportionality and the rule of reasonableness, they may not, ceteris paribus,
be justifiable. Customary international law cannot recognize a belligerent
right which is ineffective and which permits an actor to fail to lay an even
hand on those regarding whom it has the right or privilege of imposing its
regime. Thus a maritime exclusion zone which is only enforced sporadically
or randomly merely by, raiding tactics should not be seen as entitled to
recognition as lawful under customary international law.
The practice of declaring maritime war zones or exclusion zones arose,
as Professor Stone has pointed out, from the necessities of the situation
confronting, not only the United Kingdom, as Stone argues, but Germany
as well. The reliance by both sides on invoking belligerent reprisals
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camouflaged the "long term transformation of the traditional laws of
blockade. "94 The question, however, remains, what values apply to legitimate
that transformation and what values will reject either or both claims to
validity? It is, furthermore, a thesis of this paper, that these two disparate
types of war zones are not utilized symmetrically. Indeed, while the former
is based on an effective persisting holding logistical strategy the latter is based
on a raiding logistical strategy. In contrast with positions such as those taken
by Stone or Fenrick, this paper views these unlike devices in aid of strategy
as not being entitled to be treated as alike juridically. Indiscriminate sinkings
of merchant ships by the U-boat arm as the main means of pursuing a raiding
logistical strategy cannot claim to fit under justifications which may uphold
the legality of the persisting logistical strategies reflected in the Long Distance
Blockades by, respectively, the Entente Powers (in World War I) and the
United Nations (in World War II). The two modes of waging economic war
and the strategies by which they were pursued were so different that it would
be absurd to invoke arguments and evidences justifying the latter to validate
the former.
Necessity is also reflected in the changed circumstances of modern
economic warfare. Technological change, in the form of the ever-increasing
destructiveness of modern weaponry, has created new challenges for the
international law of armed conflict. Furthermore, the strategic challenges
presented by the contemporary development of advanced nations' economic
infrastructures have called for new responses in terms of economic warfare
which, in turn, have created new challenges for the international
humanitarian law relevant to their deployment and use. When the rules of
blockade were first evolved, most European states relied quite heavily on the
coastal maritime transportation of their goods, even for domestic and internal
trade. At that time contraband and blockade control was relatively simple
because goods would pass from port to port by sea and their destination would
be revealed by their movement even if transshipments were involved. Today
most states, even such states as Iraq and Argentina, have extensive waterways
and railways for internal and international transportation. By rail Iran can
be supplied from the Soviet Union and by highways from China and Pakistan.
Writing of such an expansion of states' economic infrastructure as this factor
existed back in the time of World War II, Julius Stone wrote:
The expansion of alternative rail and inland waterway transport facilities, with which
Germany was superlatively endowed, transformed this situation. "The conditions of
modern commerce offer almost infinite opportunities for concealing the real nature of
a transaction, and every device which the ingenuity of the persons concerned or their
lawyers could suggest has been employed to give shipments intended for Germany the
appearance of genuine transactions with a neutral country."95

B. "Necessity" in the Formation of Customary International Law
While some writers% tend to denigrate the role of "historical" or "social"
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"necessity" as a possible alternative, or additional, element of opinio juris, the
argument here is that changes in the technological and social infrastructure
of a social relationship operate to bring about legal change, not so much under
the rubric of opinio juris, as under that of its disjunctive97 clause sive necessitatis.
This disjunctive meaning would appear to be inherent (but to most writers
latently so) in the traditional Latin formulation.
The second step, in reviewing the relevance of the criteria for determining
the incremental effect on legal change of the technological and socioeconomic substratum, is to observe that an emerging custom may tend to
displace existing rights assured under international law. For example, the
continental shelf doctrine was criticized, in its early years, as potentially
displacing the traditional, and entrenched, freedom of the high seas-for
example, the traditional rights of trawling, dredging and anchoring anywhere
beyond states' territorial seas. Thus, Professor Humphrey Waldock, later
President of the International Court of Justice, observed, on April 5, 1950,
that: "[ t ]he suggested new doctrine of the continental shelfis not merely novel
but involves a reversal of existing customary [international] law. "98 But this
consideration did not prevent Waldock from arguing in favor of recognizing
that now popularly accepted, but then emerging, doctrine as customary
international law.
Even more significantly, and regardless of the strategies involved (i.e.,
persisting and hence "effective", or raiding, and hence, random and thus
proportionately ineffective), the recognition of states' claims to establish
Maritime Exclusionary Zones as lawful will always necessarily be effectuated
at the expense of freedom of the high seas for all navigation including, to
the extent necessity may limit them, the rights of neutral traders. In this
regard, of course, belligerent maritime war zones, or exclusionary zones,
which are usually intended to last the duration of the conflict, are t9 be
distinguished from the usually more transient, maritime exclusion zones that
states establish for bombing and gunnery exercises in times of peace. They
(i.e., belligerent maritime exclusion zones) are also to be distinguished from
those maritime zones which states announce for the testing of nuclear devices
and weapons. These, with perhaps one exception, that of France99 in recent
years, have been predicated, not on an enclosure of an area of the oceans,
but on the principle of a "Warning to Mariners." This device simply notifies
aircraft and ships proposing to use the area of the dangers to them attending
the notifying state's exercise of its own freedom of the high seas. It should
be stressed, in this context, that such warnings may be brief, or may remain
in place for indefinite periods of time. lOO Clearly, the task of establishing the
emergence of a customary rule permitting belligerent states to impair, if not
eliminate, the rights of neutrals to enjoy the freedom of the high seas is far
more burdensome than defending the privilege of states, in the pursuit of their
national security interests, to create temporary dangers for shipping in limited
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sea areas, by testing weapons on the high seas or engaging in bombing and
gunnery practice and by issuing warnings to others of the presence of those
dangers.

C. The Legal Significance of Diplomatic Protest as an Inhibiting Factor in the
.
Formation of a Customary Norm
Diplomatic protest has been seen as an inhibitor of custom, and writers
have suggested that its absence can be strong evidence of acquiescence to a
change in customary international law and, hence, to the emergence of a new
norm supplanting and negating the old.t°l But, as D'Amato points out, states
"do not issue notes of protest to the actions of other states that they regard
as illegal under international law, " and argues that "[£]oreign offices which
did so would have little time for anything else. "102 He also maintains the
interesting thesis that reliance on this procedure as a factor in the making
or the restraining of the formation of customary international law is too
narrow and more restrictive than necessary for the recognition and validation
of new rules. He points out, on the contrary, that the sources and the flow
of decisions in the process of forming a new customary norm of international
law is much more flexible and pluralistic. He states, and this writer agrees
fully with his argument, that:
This diplomacy is usually conducted verbally by ambassadors, representatives, consuls,
visiting businessmen, and so forth. The range of negotiating tactics is quite vast, including
threats to corporate assets of the other country's nationals that are located in the
complaining state, retaliation by raising tariff barriers, reduce foreign economic or
military aid to the target state or its allies or dependents, support another country's
hostility to the target state, vote against the target state in the United Nations, and
related threats or warnings. 103

The fact that the United States, the major protesting state against the
creation of prohibited zones (or war zones) in both W orld Wars, embraced
the policy of creating them after becoming a participant in both, tends greatly
to undermine the significance of both sets of her protests. In any event, and,
in addition, following the principle that" actions speak louder than words, "104
the United States' affirmative policy regarding maritime exclusion (war)
zones after she became a belligerent should carry more weight than her
previously published protests as a neutral. It should be noted, too, that in
World War II, while neutrals such as the Netherlands and Norway regarded
the British resort to maritime exclusion zones as contrary to international
law down to May 1940, thereafter these two countries, through their
governments-in-exile, supported such zones, as did the United States after
its entry into W odd War II. in light of the subsequent conduct of the states
that engaged most vociferously in voicing their diplomatic protests against
the declaration of maritime exclusion zones, the conclusion may be drawn
that the diplomatic protests lodged against the declaration and enforcement
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of exclusion zones established by the Entente Powers in W arid War I as well
as the United Nations in WorId War II are of dubious efficacy and carry
little or no weight in restraining the emergence of a customary international
law norm legitimizing maritime exclusion zones. This is the case despite the
fact that these regimes in their various forms, encroach upon the doctrine
of freedom of the high seas and despite their effect of curtailing the traditional
rights and immunities of neutrals.
With regard to the diplomatic reaction to the British Total Exclusionary
Zone of April 30, 1982, the Soviet Union, as has been noted,105 took a critical
stance. But, because the Soviet Union was the only non-belligerent that
complained about the TEZ and, furthermore, because the British did not
attack any neutral ships within the zone, it would appear that most interested
states acquiesced in it as reasonable. Nor did the Soviet Union have any more
than a theoretical basis for its academic comment. That is, she engaged in
the relatively unusual, according to Professor D'Amato, act of protesting
without being injured and on the basis; merely, of a theoretical disagreement
with the British announcement. 106 The Soviet Union had received no injury
in fact, and hence the basis for its diplomatic protest may be questionable.
Finally, because the Soviet Union's mode of characterizing the zone did not
accurately reflect the British policy of ensuring safeguards for neutrals,l07 the
Soviets' protest cannot be regarded as having significantly effective validity
in restraining the emergence of customary international law norms on the
subject.

IV. Customary Law and the Usages of War:
the Substratum of Modification and The
Relevance of Military Utility
A. Relativism, Military Economy108 and the Role of Law
The Romans may have believed the maxim inter arma silent leges, but today,
unless a contest becomes "absolute"l09 in the Clausewitzian sense or "total"
in the nuclear holocaust sense, there are, necessarily, areas of common interest
where the principles of humanity, reciprocity and utility have important
functions. In addition, as has already been observed, the value of military
economy,110 which provides the sound basis for planning any campaign, gives
rise to a second development, namely the mutual respect of common restraints
as a matter of common interest. In his defense of the utility of international
law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht pointed out:
At the same time, in view of the humanitarian character of a substantial part of the
rules of war it is imperative that during the war these rules should be mutually observed
regardless of the legality of the war. For it is these rules which, on the whole, have
been generally observed in the past-for the reason perhaps that they do not seriously
interfere with the achievement of the major purpose of the war.l11
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Indeed, building upon Lauterpacht's thesis, it is possible to say that in all
wars, except those that Clausewitz identified as "absolute" (and considered,
in the pre-nuclear age in which he lived, to be impossible to wage112), the
interest of both or all belligerents is that rules which temper the ferocity of
waging war, and especially those that confer a benefit in terms of military
economy, should be observed. This prudential economy of force is not so much
a matter of a warrior's self-image as being sans peur et sans reproche, as of military
utility and each belligerent's self-interest in expending the minimum of force
for achieving the object of the contest and of maintaining a reserve of force
to meet further contingencies. 1l3 Furthermore, Clausewitz accepted the fact
that the inherent "frictions,"114 "checks," and "modifications" inherent in
"the apparatus of War," and "the non-conducting medium which hinders
the complete discharge"115 of belligerent powers (energy), acted as restraints
on focusing the complete direction of energy, without any diffusion, onto
the object of the war itself. In addition, in our own day, we have come to
call, not for the "utmost use of force, ':116 but "limited" applications of force
in the sense that the whole power of the state is not concentrated into an
all-consuming effort of will to which all other considerations are
subordinated. For it is highly probable (or well-nigh inevitable) that the more
intense becomes the focus of the will to win the greater will be the temptations
to flout relevant rules of international law, especially if these are perceived
as restraints on the will to victory. While soldiers and statesmen are mistaken
in perceiving the rules of international law as adding to Clausewitz's "nonconducting medium" acting as a restraint on the complete direction of energy,
the possibility of their doing so may render the atmosphere of all-out effort
inimical to the observation of lawful conduct.

B. Limited War: When Militarily Viable and, at the Same Time, Receptive of
Humanitarian Law
Von Clausewitz tells us that political ends may decree that a precise balance
should be struck between means and ends.ll7 While not resorting to the "utmost
use of force," a country waging a limited war must yet master its enemy within
the limiting frame of that type of warfare. The commander should act "to a
certain extent upon the principle of only applying so much force and aiming
at such an object in War as is just sufficient for the attainment of its political
object. "118 Experience also illustrates this point. For example, Professor Levie
has pointed out that the 1982 Falkland Islands Conflict provided an example
in which the fighting was kept within bounds so that the future of the laws
of war, having the traditional effect of temperamenta belli, remained quite bright,
since in that conflict, the localization of the hostilities, which was assisted by
the proclamations of six of the seven exclusion zones, kept the war "a
gentlemen's war".119 A geographically more diffuse conduct of the hostilities
would have led to much more violent and destructive operations, indeed to those

Goldie

183

political frenzies which undermine the will to observe the laws of war in an
obsessive determination to triumph at all costs.
The thesis presented here is that, first, we should view the intensity of the
war in which the issues of legality arise as a possible variable influencing the
willingness of each of the combatants to see its own interest in abiding by the
rules of war. Thus, for example, as Professor Levie tells us, a limited war at
sea may be one in which the rules of war are observed and developed by new
conditions. But some wars, for example such wars of national liberation as the
Algerian revolt against French colonial rule, were, at least according to some
writers, limited wars, yet were redolent with inhumane excesses. Thus a
military commander present in Algeria during the uprising there that led
eventually to independence, and who had a crucial counter-insurgency role to
play, has confirmed that such wars are not, and cannot, of their nature be,
"gentlemen's wars," but ones of terrorism, widespread atrocities and genocide.
Those crimes were not (in the Algerian context) committed so much on the
part of the incumbent government, which usually had to work under the eyes
of the press, television news and the public, but rather by the insurgent groups.
Thus, that officer (the author Roger Trinquier) wrote:
In the month of September 1958, the forces of order took possession of the flIes of a
military tribunal of one of the regions of the F.L.N. In the canton of Michelet alone,
in the arrondissement (district) of Fort-National in Kabylie more than 2,000 inhabitants
were condemned to death and executed between November 1, 1954 and April 17, 1957.120

In many wars, be they the "total" wars as exemplified by the two World
Wars, or certain "local wars" such as, for example, the Iran-Iraq War (19801988), or wars in which terroristic insurgencies pit themselves against
incumbent regimes, the parties' adherences to the laws of war become
subordinated to their all-absorbing, indeed obsessive, struggle for survival.
But in between the two extremes of "gentlemen's" limited wars on the one
hand, and the self-imposed limitations of an incumbent regime in its fight
against terrorism on the other, there do exist, owing to a possibly prevailing
political climate between the adversaries, considerations for statesmen who
see beyond the conflict itself to the post-war settlements. When such a
prudential far-sightedness prevails, wars may be waged in truly limited modes
and are subjected by their participants to the governance of the laws and
usages of war. Of these the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904-04 and the 1982 Falklands Conflict provide practical models.
C. Emergence of the Maritime Exclusion Zones as Customary Law: A Matter
of Contexts
(1) General Recapitulation
At the outset of this chapter the presentation was in terms of the emergence
of maritime exclusion zones in the context of the famous long distance
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blockades of World Wars I and II. These were reviewed in terms of the
distinct, but frequently overlapping, criteria of defensive versus offensive
objectives and of persisting versus raiding combat or logistical strategies and
tactics. The survey of these regimes began with the Japanese defense zones
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 and the United States defense zones
which were established in April 1917 on the model of the earlier Japanese
zones. While those defense zones may be regarded as having the status of
accepted custom, the more controversial long-distance blockading, prohibited
maritime zones or logistical strategies may not yet appear to have received
unqualified, universal endorsement of legality. But, subject to the test of
proportionality and reasonableness, and especially when created for purposes
of maintaining a persisting logistical strategy supported by an adequate ratio
of force to time and space, they may appear to be moving conditionally into
the light of recognition as customary international law. Writing in 1952, Sir
Hersch Lauterpacht stated:
[M]easures regularly and uniformly repeated in successive wars in the form of reprisals
and aiming at the economic isolation of the opposing belligerent must be regarded as
a development of the latent principle of the law of blockade, namely, that the belligerent
who possesses the effective command of the sea is entitled to deprive his opponent of
the use thereof for the purpose either of navigation by his own vessels or conveying
on neutral vessels such goods as are destined to or originate from him. 121

In contradistinction from Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's thesis, the argument in
this chapter is that, for the evolution of an even-handed, predictable system
governing exclusion zones, it is necessary for scholars to be discriminating;
otherwise a Panglossian position could evolve which merely states that the
commander of the sea may dictate, merely by virtue of his power, what the
law allows. Furthermore, the phrase "commander of the sea" is ambiguous.
In World War I Great Britain held undisputed command of the surface of
the sea. Yet this command did not command Germany's indiscriminate
submarine warfare. After the United States entered the war new
developments, as well as a far greater concentration of naval forces, narrowly
defeated that almost overwhelming threat. Thus, the issue of legality should
be tested by more discriminating criteria than upholding the strategies that
combatants may view as necessary for their belligerent successes.
Aspects from the considerations already stressed reveal that due regard
must always be had for the principles of humanity, proportionality,
reciprocity, and utility. Humanitarian law imposes its standards, and they may
be most effective when they can be shown to combine with the principle
of military economy to moderate the ferocity of fighting's side effects and
limit the violence of war's impact upon those drawn into its vortex.
(2) Exclusion Zones as Facultative Instruments
The point has already been made that Admiral Doenitz was not found guilty
of the charges which arose from his orders to the German U-boat arm to
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engage in unrestricted submarine warfare contrary to the London Navy
Treaty of 1930 and the 1936 Naval Protocol. This decision was ambiguously
reached, as to principle, after the Tribunal had received evidence of British
and United States methods of waging unrestricted submarine warfare,
respectively, in the Skagerrak and the Pacific Ocean. l22 A distinction should
be drawn, however, between the British maritime exclusion zone (namely
of the Skaggerak) and that proclaimed by the United States. This latter zone
consisted of the whole Pacific Ocean. The question thus becomes one of
reviewing Maritime Exclusion Zones in terms of both the strategies they
facilitate and of the values they promote.

(a) The Exclusion Zone of the Skaggerak
The Skaggerak is an arm of the North Sea on its eastern side and lies
between Denmark and Norway. It is some 150 nautical miles in length and
85 miles in width. 123 By contrast with this relatively restricted area, the Pacific
Ocean covers approximately one-third of the Earth's surface. While both
declarations may be found to be legally supportable, a basic distinction should
be made between the grounds of their respective justifications. The argument
vindicating the British proclamation of the Skaggerak as a maritime exclusion
zone under emerging customary international law may be accepted, since the
strategy for enforcing the exclusion of the adversary from the zone was an
apparently successful one. It was a persisting logistical strategy enforced by
both aircraft and submarines providing an adequate ratio of force to space.
This proposition can be analyzed out into the following elements.
(i) The zone was reasonable in area, and despite German surface naval
power, the logistical strategy was persistently maintained and was made
effective through submarine and aerial warfare;
(ii) The object, while not primarily one of self-defense, was for the related
purposes of:
(a) Hampering the German utilization of Norwegian territory as a
base for attacking the British Isles and North Atlantic convoys (including,
of course, those going to Murmansk with aid for Russia);
(b) encumbering Germany's reinforcements and supplies destined for
its oppressive occupation of Norway-a victim of Nazi aggression;
(c) the target shipping had military objectives and purposes and could
not be viewed as carrying supplies which had the object of benefitting the
civilian population of Norway; and
(d) the ratio of the area to the force deployed was proportional to
the military objective in hand.

(b) The Pacific Exclusion Zone
By contrast with the Skaggerak, the Pacific Ocean, the world's largest,
has an area of 69,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Arctic Circle
to Antarctica. 124 An announcement of indiscriminate sinking by submarines
in such a vast area may not, it is suggested, reasonably be regarded as the
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enforcement of a maritime exclusion zone, except by a naval service many
times larger than the enormous force that the United States Navy deployed
there. It is believed, furthermore, that the adjunct of a continuing presence
of air power would have been a necessary adjunct for ensuring an effective
persisting logistical strategy. For one thing, in so vast an area a submarine
fleet of almost any size, on its own, cannot satisfy the requirement of
"effectiveness. " The sinking of ships thus becomes contingent on the presence,
coincidentally, of a target ship and targeting submarine in proximity to one
another.
Alternatively, as the case of the United States submarine service's
operations in the Pacific illustrated, these coincidences tended to concentrate,
before the liberation of the Philippines, in Philippine and Japanese home
waters. Accordingly, although the United States Navy identified the whole
Pacific as the exclusion zone, in fact the areas of actual attack tended to be
where concentrations of Japanese shipping were to be found and where the
submarines were ordered. Hence, in the zones of actual combat there was
an adequate ratio of force to space and time. But the space so treated was
far smaller than the Pacific Ocean.
Of course, strategic and intelligence issues created an advantage in leaving
the defined zone as the larger area, since the element of surprise, which
provides the submarine with its single most important asset, could be lost
if, as the war progressed, different, more limited, and more proportionate
exclusion zones were progressively announced as the Allied Forces
approached the Japanese home islands. In effect, in the smaller sea areas where
submarine tactics were effective, persisting logistical tactics maintained the
necessary effective pressure on Japanese shipping; but the raiding strategy
on which this mode of warfare was founded, by reason of the extent of the
maritime prohibited zone, did not provide effectiveness.
On the other hand, while strategic convenience and utility may call for
the announcement of the larger area, the legal rule of reasonableness does
not reinforce the strategic consideration, since it is not reasonable to expect
an effective enforcement, at all points of the Pacific Ocean, of the prohibition
to shipping indicated in the proclamation or enunciation of such a zone.
Rather, the U.S. submarines, like the German wolf-packs in the North
Atlantic, tended to resemble more the "corsair" type of traditional maritime
warfare (with the difference, of course, that the submarines were regular
naval units, not privateers) rather than the enforcement of a specific maritime
exclusion zone. On the other hand, while such an announcement as that of
Admiral Nimitz of the vast maritime exclusion zone, which in itself was
tantamount to a hunting license in the conduct of a raiding strategy, may
not have found justification under any emerging customary norm-being
more an analogy to a policy of worldwide indiscriminate submarine warfare
than to the creation of a lawful maritime exclusion zone.

Goldie

187

The United States Navy's submarine strategy may, alternatively, be
justified as a reprisal against the Japanese methods of waging war, from the
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, to that country's
inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and of civilian internees caught under
their occupation and, hence, not participating, pro tanto, in the emergence of
a customary norm of international law. In addition, it should be noted, the
Japanese, on their part, waged an inhumane and indiscriminate, even if
relatively ineffective and militarily inept, submarine warfare on their own
part. This mode of warfare on the part of Japan clearly marked, despite its
relative ineffectiveness, the reprisals the United States Navy enforced by the
submarine arm. Thus, the surprise advantage accorded by the vastness of the
Pacific Ocean, which might be seen as negating the reasonableness of the
United States declaration under an emerging rule of customary international
law, may not be abrogated. It should instead properly be justified under the
law of belligerent reprisals rather than as participating in the emergence of
a customary norm of international law permitting states, who comply with
the necessary criteria, to establish maritime exclusion zones.
Again, the "exclusion zones" created by Iran and Iraq do not seem to have
been relevant to those countries' attacks on each other's shipping or to attacks
that they made on the shipping of third (neutral) parties. With regard to the
Falklands Conflict, in light of the above argument it is believed that the
exclusion zones established by both sides, including the "British Bubble," but
excluding the last of the Argentine proclamations, namely of the "South
Atlantic War Zone" on May 11,1982, were valid, and testify to the emergence
of the relevant customary norm. That last Argentine proclamation was both
vague as to area, and random, and hence militarily ineffective, as to
enforcement. Accordingly, it should be found to have failed in the test of
reasonableness. Indeed, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit pointed out in the Amerada Hess casel25 the sinking of the Hercules was
an international wrong. In reaching this conclusion, the court ignored
(correctly, it is suggested) any relevance that the Argentinian Declaration
of the "South Atlantic War Zone" might have had as a justification, had it
not resulted in a randomly chosen raiding action.
While, perhaps, the view already quoted from Professor Lauterpacht, and
reiterated by Professor Julius Stonel26 may be overbroadly permissive, the
opposing thesis recently expressed by Ross Leckow that "the implementation
of war zones can be justified only in very restricted circumstances . . . "127
and his restricted condonation of resort to this device in terms of
"reasonableness"l28 is not supported without a necessary spelling out of the
meaning of the word in terms of strategies and goals, and in terms of means
and methods relative to those strategies and goals.
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V. Summary Conclusion
At the present time, more than in Clausewitz's day, war has taken on a
chameleon-like character. It now depends on politics both as to means and
to ends. Thus law necessarily must adjust to the variable social and ideological
substrata upon which its pursuit depends in all their protean forms.
Accordingly, while the following quotation from the late Professor Julius
Stone's magisterial work on the regulation and control of conflict situations
is seen as uttering an important insight, it should be treated as an invitation
to rethink the emerging rules, and to treat states' conduct in the area, and
the consecration of allegedly emerging rules with discriminatory reservation,
rather than the undiscriminating proposal of a new norm of customary
intemationallaw covering most, if not all, of the relevant situations. Stone
eloquently and perhaps even cogently wrote:
It is idle to seek to reduce this matter to a en de coeur of humanity. War law, even
at its most merciful, is no expression ofsheer humanity, save as adjusted to the exigencies
of military success, a truth as bitter (but no less true) about attacks on merchant ships,
as about target area saturation bombing. And it is also quite idle for Powers whose
naval supremacy in surface craft enables them to pursue the aim of annihilating the
enemy's seaborne commerce without "sink at sight" warfare, to expect that States which
cannot aspire to such supremacy will refrain from seeking to annihilate that commerce
by such naval means available to them as submarines, aircraft and mines. To refuse to
face this will save neither life nor ship in any future war; and it will also forestall the
growth of real rules for the mitigation and suffering under modem conditions.I29

Stone's observation about practicalities and expectations is without doubt
correct. The experience of two World Wars tells that legal change in the
direction towards which the late Professor Stone points is becoming
crystallized. On the other hand, while the insight and direction of the
quotation reflects contemporary needs, it tells us little about testing the
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable formulations for declaring
maritime exclusion zones and resorting to submarine warfare to enforce them.
The preceding pages have sought to foreshadow and examine
discriminating tests for determining whether a maritime prohibited zone is
entitled to deference and compliance, as being lawful, or whether it should
be resisted by third parties as unlawful. It is now useful to analyze and subsume
models of the types of maritime prohibited zones that have been met in history,
including very recent history, under the heads that have been developed in
terms of goals and strategies. But before that analysis is presented, a general
point should be made: while circumstances may dictate whether or not
publicity, and the giving of a timely notice, may, or may not, be to the
strategic advantage of a belligerent (as for example it was clearly so in the
case of the British Falkland Islands proclamation that took effect on April
12, 1982130), publicity is clearly a necessary precondition for the legal validity
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of every exclusion zone. In this context, Fenrick has correctly argued that
the declaring state should:
[P]ublicly declare the existence, location and duration of the zone, what is excluded
from the zone, and the sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the
zone without permission, and also to provide enough lead time before the zone comes
into effect to allow ships to clear the area.13I

This paper will now summarize and review the arguments that have been
developed in terms of ends and means, goals, strategies and methods, and
tactics in resorting to maritime prohibited zones as instruments of waging
war.
A. Defensive Goals and Persisting Logistical Strategies
First, it is suggested that purely defensive zones of reasonably limited
extent, regarding which a timely and public notice to all affected ships and
aircraft has been given, for example those established by Japan in the RussoJapanese War, 1904-05 and by the United States in 1917,132 have always been
acceptable to other maritime powers, even though they did trespass onto the
high seas as then delimited. Despite their far greater extent than those of
1904 and 1917, the British and Argentinian exclusion zones (except for that
latter country's last proclamation of such a zone which sought to constitute
the South Atlantic Ocean as a maritime prohibited zone) in the Falkland
Islands Conflict of 1982, were lawful on the same grounds. 133 These may,
accordingly, be justified on the basis of the publicity of their announcement,
the specificity of their delineation, the fact that adequate time was given for
affected shipping to quit the area, and the restraint (and proportionality)
exercised in the enforcement.134 Furthermore, after the arrival of the
expeditionary force, the British zones reflected a defensive strategy
(although, necessarily, they were part of their proponent's attacking tactics),
were logistically persistent and involved an adequate ratio of force to space
and time. Hence they also satisfied the traditional, but still prevailing,
customary international law rule which requires effectiveness,135
proportionality, reasonableness and, so far as the United Kingdom was
concerned, appropriateness for advancing that country's lawful purpose,
namely compliance of both sides with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 502.136
At this point it may be noted in passing that "Operation Market Time,"
which was enforced by the United States Navy during the Vietnamese War
was legally valid since it was a law-enforcement operation limited to a
distance of twelve miles from the low water mark of South Vietnam (it did
not extend north beyond the DMZ) and so within the domestic competence
of South Vietnam, which legislated to empower the activity. Since that
operation was conducted entirely within the territorial sea and contiguous
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zone of South Vietnam, it does not come within the perspective of the present
paper. 137 Similarly, the blockade of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese
ports was justified in the Naval Commander's Handbook as being "in conformity
with traditional criteria ... , "138 and should not be regarded as falling within
the emerging concept of maritime prohibited zones, but rather of the
traditional notions of blockade.
B. Defensive Goals Expressed in Raiding Logistical Strategies and Tactics
The establishment of unacceptable and hence invalid maritime defensive
zones for the purpose of warning an enemy that shipping could be attacked
without further warning, but which cannot be consistently sustained, was
exemplified by all three of the Argentinian proclamations. Apart from
Security Council Resolution 502,139 which declared Argentine presence in the
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) to be unlawful, the first two Argentine
proclamations may be viewed as lawful in terms of jus in bello in
contradistinction to any reference to arguments in terms ofjus ad bellum. But
that country's third legally indeterminate and ineffective proclamation of
May 11, 1982, failed to comply with any criteria of validity.140 On the other
hand, it appeared that none of the three could be sustained by a persisting
logistical strategy, so that, on the basis of effectiveness in terms of an adequate
ratio of force to space and time, they all become questionable as only being
sustained by raiding tactics. These tactics, and the strategy from which they
were derived, are no more than the exploitation of the forces' nuisance value.
While causing loss of life and supplies, they were too sporadic to affect the
adversary's will, or the outcome of the contest. The criticism, in earlier
paragraphs, of the United States' establishment of the Pacific Ocean as a
maritime zone from which Japanese shipping was purported to be excluded
during World War iI, reflects the non-validating combination of the criteria
of defensive goals expressed through logistical raiding strategies and tactics.

c. Aggressive Goals and Persisting Strategies
In the Indo-Pakistan War the Indian Navy established an exclusion or
blockade zone outside the Pakistani port of Karachi. No specific zone was
proclaimed, but any shipping, regardless of flag, was targetted on the high
seas. India had a sufficient ratio of power to space to maintain its attacks
on neutral shipping both within and without the zone of blockade. That is,
while the purpose was aggressive, Indian power was sufficient to maintain
a persisting and effective control of the zone affected as well as sea areas
beyond it. The reasons that this persisting exercise of power did not become
the target of angry repercussions in the rest of the world have been ascribed
to the following factors:
(i) The conflict itself was "short-lived-about a week;"141
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(ii) Because of the shortness of the time of the blockade, Professor
Daniel 0 'Connell believed that there was little time for reaction. He observed
that, "[hJad the naval blockade been prolonged and strictly enforced,
however, the situation might have become very different, especially if the
important tanker traffic through the Straits of Hormuz had been
incommoded; "142
(iii) Most of the shipowners who did suffer loss recovered through their
insurance brokers under war risk clauses. In O'Connell's phrase, they
"shrugged their shoulders" at the destruction that the Indian Navy inflicted.
O'Connell did, however, also mention the case of the sinking of a Spanish
ship. This ship's case "was taken up by the Spanish Government, which
demanded compensation from the Indian Government. "143 He added: "This
was refused. "144
Although, from the lawyers' point of view, the issues raised by this conflict
may have been left in an indeterminate and unresolved condition, their
incompleteness provides an important invitation to resolve the facts left
dangling in this way under international law. The Indian experience shows
how the maintenance of an aggressive, persisting logistical strategy
necessarily must be classified as illegal, despite its effectiveness, since the
aggressive use of force against neutral shipping not concerned in the war is
contrary to the basic principles of international law and the principles and
purpose of the United Nations.

D. Offensive (Aggressive) Goals Supported by a Raiding Strategy
Although in both World Wars Germany proclaimed prohibited zones in
which her submarines would sink merchant shipping, including neutral
shipping on sight and without warning, the system was not one of maintaining
a prohibited zone as such, but of creating hunting licenses for submarines.
The zones were not predicated on the defensive requirements of the German
homeland. Thus, they may be contrasted with the actions of Japan in 1904145
and the United States in 1917146• In addition, they were carried out in
fulfillment of a raiding strategy which depended on raiding tactics. 147 At no
time was there any attempt to hold a sea area by means even of persisting
tactics, let alone of an effective and persisting strategy. The idea of
establishing and validating a prohibited zone simply by means of a raiding
strategy implemented by the surprise excursions of submarines on sink-onsight hunting missions constitutes a complete contradiction of the notion of
maintaining, effectively, a prohibited maritime zone.
While the sea areas proclaimed as prohibited to their adversaries (such as
those by Germany in both World Wars and the United States in World War
II) may not qualify as lawful maritime exclusion zones they may, possibly,
be justified under some alternative rubric. For example, the United States
zone might well have been upheld, at the time of its proclamation, as a reprisal
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for previous illegal acts or policies by the Japanese naval and military forces.
Such zones, however by their very nature, cannot be classified as complying
with the requirements of self-defense, proportionality, reasonableness, and
effectiveness. Nor can they be seen as providing validating persistent logistical
strategies through effective and comprehensive enforcement throughout the
zones proclaimed. Hence, they may not be viewed as legitimated by any
emerging rule of customary international law dependent on effectiveness and
reasonableness.
An argument pointing, possibly, in favor of the validity of the German
North Atlantic maritime exclusion zone and the United States zone of the
Pacific may be founded on other, narrower, grounds, namely that the ships
attacked were part of the enemy's war effort and were naval auxiliaries, not
true merchant ships. This would leave as impermissible, however, attacks on
neutral shipping. It would, further, lead to characterizing aggravated and
unnecessary attacks on survivors in lifeboats, on lifeboats, or clinging to
wreckage or other flotation gear as war crimes for which there would be
neither excuse nor defense. l48 But this issue relates only to the limits imposed
by humanity and necessity on the specific acts which a state or a commander
undertakes when implementing a raiding strategy and faces the consequences
of his immediate resort to raiding tactics. He runs a high risk of being
stigmatized for engaging in the impermissible conduct that his actions may
well entail. Such inhumane conduct as that attributed, for example, to KarlHeinz Moehle,149 and testified to in The Peleus Case150 remain impermissible
under the Nuremburg Principles and decisions.
E. Persisting Moveable Defense Maritime Zones Effectuated by Persisting Tactics
Reference has already been made to the defense "Bubble" established by
the United Kingdom on April 23, 1982.151 O'Co?-Ilell has pointed out that prior
to that war operational zones consisting of a moveable circle centering on
a naval or amphibious task force, "have the benefit of the precedent of the
Spanish Civil War".152 This reference relates to the very interesting and
largely forgotten Nyon Arrangements. 153 Such a "moveable war zone" will
assuredly have a wide application in the future. When shown to be consistent
with such criteria as reasonableness, self-defense, and proportionality
between means and ends, these zones are within what may be legally
permissible. Professor O'Connell wrote in support of them "that they would
not have the characteristics of the war zones condemned at Nuremberg."
He warned, however, that "[t]his is not to eliminate legal doubts about the
matter, but rather to indicate that the law appears to be sufficiently malleable
to give naval staffs a certain freedom of manoeuvre in their planning. "154

F. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to relate the question of the possibly emerging
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legality, under international law, of certain types of maritime prohibited
zones as instruments of war strategy. They have been seen, largely, but not
entirely, as involved with logistical strategies, although these zones may also
of course, be used to redirect shipping at the belligerent's strategic and tactical
battle convenience, provide an early warning defensive system, and limit the
area of belligerent activities in any specific contest. It is, of course, true that
the goals of the interdiction of supplies to an enemy, the redirection of
shipping, the establishment of defensive zones and the limitation of the area
of a contest, are all lawful goals. The means and methods, including the
strategies and tactics that provide the modalities of achieving these goals, may
not necessarily or inevitably be justifiable. Lawfulness will, of course, depend
on their specific characteristics and objectives. Also, some goals for which
maritime exclusion zones may be deployed, for example, waging an
aggressive war or for facilitating an act of aggressive and surprise attack on
an unsuspecting victim, or indiscriminately operating against neutral shipping
and failing to observe the principle of distinction, are clearly unlawful and
are to be avoided by states proposing to establish such zones.
With regard to lawfulness of the means and methods employed in furthering
lawful ends, the attempt has been made to review the various strategies and
tactics as they tend to be employed to facilitate the belligerent's goals. While
some of those may be tainted with the unlawfulness of the ends for which
they are used, others are, and should remain, unlawful per se on the grounds
of their being tainted by their inherent wrongfulness. Their means alone are
fatal to their legality. Examples of such tainting elements include their
unreasonableness, their want of specificity of definition in space and time
(including their failure to allow adequate time for neutral shipping to quit
the proclaimed area), their ineffectiveness, and their lack of proportionality
to the ends sought. Others may be invalidated by acts of specific inhumanity
involved in their enforcement. They are also unlawful if they are simply used
as means of giving further effectiveness to raiding strategies.
This paper's purpose in coupling strategies and tactics involved with their
goals was to examine the possibility of consecrating some maritime prohibited
zones, especially those that scrupulously observe the principle of distinction
and respect the rights of neutral shipping and commercial activities, as
becoming increasingly acceptable and hence lawful by distinguishing them
from those that remain unlawful. This was done in terms of viewing the
strategies and the tactics to which the belligerent power resorted for the
purpose of implementing the zone as part of its overall maritime war strategy
and as part of his obligation to respect the rights, privileges and immunities
of third parties. That is, the relevant strategies and tactics employed were
examined in terms of determining the lawfulness not only of ends, but also
of means and methods. This study has reviewed the interfusion of means and
ends, and the manner in which they inseparably color, condition, and
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characterize one another. Finally, a basic theme of this paper has been the
review of those criteria for appraising the emerging legality of at least those
maritime prohibited zones which show effectiveness, persistence, the
principle of distinction, respect for neutral rights, humanity, and
proportionality.
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1. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has defined maritime exclusion zones (or "war zones") as follows:
[A] war zone in maritime operations may be said to comprise an area of water which a belligerent
attempts to control, and within which it denies to foreign shipping generally the same measure
of protection which the latter might elsewhere claim.
L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1952).
v. 2, p. 681, note 1 [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht's Oppenheim]. See also, to similar effect, Julius Stone,
Legal Controls of International Conflict (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1954), p. 572 [hereinafter cited
as Stone, Legal Controls]. Under certain circumstances, a maritime exclusion zone reflects a different method
of waging war from that of conducting a traditional blockade. Such a zone may have merely the defensive
object of keeping shipping, which might otherwise constitute a threat, away from an area, for example,
of military operations. On the other hand, such zones may also be used for the purpose of denying an
adversary access to resources, economic advantages of many kinds, and war materiel. In both cases, the
object of the exclusion is logistical but may reflect a convergence of three distinct concepts: self-defense,
blockade, and combat "killing grounds" (this last being a tactical rather than a legal concept). For a
discussion of the various strategies involved, see, infra note 116 and accompanying text.
2. William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law, Pearce Higgins 8th ed. (London: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1924) [hereinafter cited as Hall]. See also C.J.B. Hurst and F.E. Bray, eds., Russian and]apanese Prize
Cases (Buffalo, N.Y.: William S. Hein Co., 1972), v. 2, pp. 343-53 [The "Quang Nam"] [hereinafter cited
as Hurst and Bray]; T.]. Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far East, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1904), pp. 83-91. See also, infra § II A.
3. See infra § II E.
4. U.S. Navy Department, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9
(Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Of£, 1987) [hereinafter Commander's Handbook or NWP 9].
5. Id., par. 7.7.5.
6. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 30-34, and the reference therein to the Declaration of Paris of1856 and the Declaration
of London of 1909. The text accompanying those notes discusses the treaty requirement of "effectiveness"
for the purpose of establishing the validity of a blockade. For the practice of the United States with regard
to the effectiveness requirement, and as reflected in the Civil War (or "War of Rebellion") 1861-65,
See Dahlgren, Maritime International Law, Cowley ed., 1877, passim, and especially 25-61. The late Daniel
P. O'Connell teaches us that the traditional concept (effectiveness) of the blockade required that it be
"visible" and continued with the observation that it "required presence of the blockading force within
visual range of the coast, although temporary withdrawal for reasons of stress of weather was not regarded
as raising of the blockade." D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1984), v. 2, p. 1150 [hereinafter cited as O'Connell, Law of the Sea]. Indeed some writers on the
traditional concept of blockade, drawing an analogy with besieging a city, argued that the blockading
ships should be at anchor. See, e.g., Stone, Legal Controls, supra note 1, p. 508.
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It [i.e., the traditional concept of blockade] presupposed that anchored ships could, with safety
to themselves, maintain close physical surveillance of the blockaded ports. It also presupposed that
a blockading vessel's sight and reach was limited by the human eye and the telescope and flag
signal.

See also !Auterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, p. 779, where the author wrote:
According to one opinion, the definition of an effective blockade pronounced by the First Armed
Neutrality of 1780 is valid, and blockade is effective only when the approach to the coast is barred
by a chain of men-of-war, anchored on the spot, and so near to one another that the line cannot
be passed without obvious danger to the passing vessel. This corresponds to the practice followed
before the First \Vorld War by France. (footnotes omitted)
It should be noted that this is not the only view. See ibid., pp. 779-80, where we find a further statement
regarding the second thesis concerning the requirement that the blockade must be effective: "According
to this opinion, there need be no chain of anchored men-of-war to expose to a cross fire any vessels
attempting to break the blockade; a real danger of capture suffices.... "
10. "Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines," October 18,1907,
T.S. 54, Statutes at Large, v. 36, p. 2332, reprinted in American Journal of International Law (Supp.), v. 2,
p. 138 (1908). See especially, articles 2 and 3. It should be noted that in !Auterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note
I, v. 2, p. 781, we find article 2 to be stigmatized as "very unsatisfactory."
11. See quotation from O'Connell, supra note 9.
12. For a brief description of "Market Time" and "Sea Dragon," see infra text accompanying notes
137 and 138.
13. See Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (1987), pp. 57-59 [hereinafter cited as Archer
Jones], especially at p. 58, where the author illustrated the term (from the Persian response to Alexander
the Great's campaign in Anatolia 334-333 B.C.) as follows:

Instead of assaulting the enemy's (i.e., Alexander's) army to defeat a Greek advance, Mardonius,
the shrewd Persian Commander, had used his superb cavalry to raid the Greek army's supply bases
to compel a retreat from its strong position at Plataea.
As the rest of this chapter will testify, Professor Archer Jones's analysis and classification of the means
and methods of waging war have been seminal to this writer's perception of the social and planning realities
underlyin~. the laws"of w~~. It .sh?~~d be adde? .that, following. Professor Jones, this writer has also used
the terms strategy and tactics In the tradmonal sense. See IiI., at p. I, where the author stated:
An analytical approach to military operations permits one to divide the topic according to the
three major components of the art of war: tactics, logistics, and strategy. Tactics should deal with
combat and with the weapons, methods, and maneuvers on the battlefield. Logistics concerns
providing the men themselves and the support of military operations, including the movement of
armies and navies and the supply of weapons, food, clothing, and shelter for the soldiers and sailors.
Strategy integrates tactics and logistics to determine the military objectives and the means of
carrying them out. Naval warfare lends itself best to a separate treatment.
14. Professor Archer Jones, id., at p. 55, also defines his seminal distinction between "raiding" and
"persisting" strategies. He writes:
\Vhereas the former [i.e., the "raiding strategy"] used a temporary presence in hostile territory,
a persisting offensive strategy envisioned a longer, even permanent, occupation of the territory
of the adversary or his allies. A persisting defensive strategy sought to prevent such an occupation.
On both the defensive, and the offensive, the persisting strategy envisioned the possibility of conflict
between the principal hostile forces; raiders, on the other hand, often could attain their objective
without significant military conflict and frequently sought to do so.
It also should be pointed out that Professor Archer Jones distinguished offensive and defensive tactics,
so that a force, following an offensive or raiding strategy might occupy a strong position and then follow
defensive tactics. Of course, he also envisioned the opposite-a defensive strategy enforced by offensive
tactics. But, in this chapter the use of defensive tactics for the purpose of putting raiders in a defensive
posture will be treated as engaging in offensive conduct.
15. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Richard II, act II, scene I, line 48.
16. Hall, supra note 2, p. 642.
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17. Hurst & Bray, supra note 2, v. 2, pp. 343-53.
18. This concept was explained in a letter of April 23, 1982, from the Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom to the President of the United Nations Security Council (S/14997), which stated,
inter alia, that:
In this connection, Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on
the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries, or military aircraft which
could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of the British forces in the South Atlantic,
will encounter the appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaged
in survei1lnace of these British forces wi1l be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with
accordingly.
Quoted in Geoffrey Marston, ed., "United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1982," British Y,arbook
of International Law, v. 53, p. 337 at pp. 540-41 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Marston].
19. See Lawrence, supra note 2, pp. 83-93.
20. U., pp. 86-87.
21. These United States orders were reproduced in Amen·canJournal of International Law (Supp.), v. 12,
pp. 13-22 (1918). See Hall, supra note 2, p. 642.
22. Hall, supra note 2, p. 642. See also Judgments of Lord Sumner in The Stigstad, 3 B & C. P.C. 347,
353, and Ertel Bieber and Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., Ltd., [1918] A.C. 260, 287. Hall, supra, note 2, p. 643, at note
2, also refers to the early U.S. Naval War College Blue Book as approving of the Japanese orders. Su
infra note 23 and accompanying text.
23. Referring with approval to the Quang Nam case (which, of course, was prior to the Japanese orders),
the influential Naval War College Blue Book offered the following solution to a problem based on the
Japanese orders:
The master appeals to the commander of a cruiser of the United States to escort him through
this area [i.e., a maritime exclusion zone similar to those proclaimed by Japan in 1904]. The voyage
would not bring the vessels within 5 miles of the coast of State X [i.e., the belligerent proclaiming
the zone in question].
What should the commander do?
SOLUTION
The commander should decline to escort the merchant vessel though the strategic area.
He should advise the master of the merchant vessel to keep clear of the strategic area.
Naval War College, International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1912), pp. 114, 129.
24. Archer Jones, supra note 13, points out, at p. 488, that:
In former wars British blockades had hurt France's economy somewhat but had never had the
effect that the [1914-18] blockade had on Germany, of reducing food consumption and handicapping
industry because it had diminished or shut off the supply of such critical supplies as oil or copper.
Never, too, had France's raiding strategy of attacking English ships come as near seriously menacing
the British economy and ability to carry on the struggle as had the German submarine campaign
against the allies. The navy's logistical strategy had acquired a new and perhaps decisive power
in the industrial age.

25. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, pp. 561-62, characterized reprisals in the following terms:
Whereas reprisals in time of peace are injurious acts committed for the purpose of compelling
a State to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by an international
delinquency, reprisals in time of war occur when one belligerent retaliates upon another, by means
of otherwise illegitimate acts of warfare, in order to compel him ... and members of his forces
to abandon i1Iegitimate acts of warfare .... They have often been used as a convenient cloak for
violations of International Law.
26. For the British and Allied position in this regard, see Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2,
pp. 791-97, and Stone, Legal Controls, supra note I, pp. 504-07, 508-10. More generally, for the British and

Goldie

197

German positions on their blockades as being justified by belligerent reprisals, see Robert W. Tucker,
The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea (Naval War College International Law Studies, v. XLX) (Washington:
u.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1957), p. 301 [hereinafter cited as Tucker]. See also, Clive Parry et aI., eds.,
Encyclopaedic Dictionary ofInternational Law (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1986), p. 337; Basdevant,
Dictio/maire de la Terminologie du Droit I/J/ernational, (1960), pp. 529-30.
27. Howarth, Sovereignty of the Seas (1974), pp. 283-84.
28. Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum Public Order: The Legal Regulation
of International Coercion (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 488-489 [hereinafter cited as McDougal
& Feliciano].
29. Id.
30. See "Declaration Respecting Maritime Law," April 16, 1856, Martens, Nouveau Recueil General, v.
15, p. 791, art. 4 [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Paris of 1856]. Art. 4 of the Declaration provides:
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.
31. Naval Conference of London, "Declaration Concerning the Law of Naval War," Feb. 26,1909,
Proceedings of tile International Naval Conference, held in London, December 1908-February 1909 (London: H.M.
Stationery Office, 1909), Cd. 4555, pp. 381-93; reprinted in Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman, The Law
of Anned Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents, 3d ed. (Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988), p. 845 [hereinafter cited as Declaration of London of
1909]. Note that the qualifier "really" in the Declaration of Paris of 1856 was repeated in article 2 of
the Declaration of London of 1909.
32. See Guichard, The Naval Blockade 1914-1918 (Turbet transl. 1930), pp. 16-18 [hereinafter cited as
Guichard].
33. See infra note 40 and the accompanying text.
34. See also supra notes 25 and 26 and the accompanying texts.
35. See Archer Jones, supra note 12, at p. 499. On realizing the utility of the submarine as a raider
carrying out a devastating logistical strategy, Germany began building an impressive submarine fleet as
fast as possible. She was not, however, able, by developing an adequate ratio of power to the vast spaces
of the Atlantic Ocean, to develop a persisting strategy. Her submarines were only able to fulfill raiding
strategy and so, despite German calculations, enough food, materiel, equipment, and American troops
were able to cross the Atlantic to ensure her defeat.
36. Id., Table 8.3, p. 468.
37. "Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines," supra note 10, arts.
2-3.
38. See supra note 30.
39. Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of November 20th, 1950, 1. C. J. Reports 1950, p.
266, at p. 276.
40. Great Britain: Order-in-Council of August 20, 1914; France: Proclamation of August 23, 1914.
41. See supra text accompanying note 32 for the outline of the facts showing. that it was in Germany's
interest that the Declaration would govern the maritime commerce of both sides.
42. Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 40-41.
43. Id., p. 42.
44. Guichard, Sllpra note 32, argues that the term "blockade of the Central Empires" was a misnomer,
since the Entente Powers, who "had a very proper respect for the Declaration of Paris of 1856" which
"prohibits the confiscation of enemy goods sailing under a neutral flag," merely seized and either
sequestrated or returned to their owners such goods and did not confiscate them. Id., pp. 42-43. It may
be noted, however, that Guichard also refers to "the blockade" and thereafter uses the word to describe
the Entente's policy. Id., p. 62.
45. See sllpra note 31 and texts accompanying notes 31-34; See also, Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 1319.
46. Id., pp. 108-10. See also William S. Sims, Victory at Sea (1921), passim.
47. See, supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also, supra text accompanying notes 32-34 and Guichard,
supra note 32, at pp. 13-19.
48. For a history of the negotiations of this affair, see Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 196-202. Guichard
there records the increasing cordiality of relations in the last months of World War I, including acceptance
of the claims of the Allied and Associated Powers with regard to the long distance blockade.
49. See Guichard, supra note 32, at p. 97. For a history of this disastrously conceived piece of
Hohenzollern diplomatic adventurism, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmerman Telegram (1958), passim,
and especially chapters 11 and 12, entitled "The Telegram in Washington," and "Obliged to Believe It."
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Tuchman believed that this latter activity on the part of Imperial Germany had a far stronger inlluence
on the United States' entry into World War I than Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.
50. Guichard, supra note 32, at p. 96.
50. IJ., pp. 97-98.
51. March 3,1918. Ratifications exchanged March 29,1918. Denounced by the Russian Government,
November 13, 1918. Abrogated by Articles 116 and 292 of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Martens,
Nouveau Recueil, v. 9:1, 3 ieme Serie 323, British and Foreign State Papers, v. 112, p. 1 (1919).
52. See Guichard, supra note 32, at pp. 97-98.
53. "Order in Council Framing Reprisals for Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany," Stat.
R. & 0., 1939 No. 1709. Stone calls this" a very moderate measure." Stone, Legal Controls, supra note
1, p. 504. Writers and commentators have also expressed surprise at the three-month delay. See, for
example, id., p. 504, note 1, and the authors cited therein. Regulation of neutral trade with the enemy,
however, became stricter under the Order-in-Council of June 11, 1940. "Order in Council Applying the
Order in Council of November 27,1939, to Italy," Stat. R & 0,1940 No. 979.
54. For the Italian protest and the United Kingdom's reply, see Cmd 6191 (1940) at pp. 2-7.
55. See "Order in Council Applying the Order in Council of November 27,1939, to Italy," supra note
53.
56. The similar claims by the United Kingdom, and later the United Nations, of a right of reprisal
because they associated themselves with Germany's methods of warfare at sea, were subsequently made
against Finland, Hungary, and Rumania. See Stone, Legal Controls, supra note 1, p. 504.
57. Id.
58. United Nations, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (1948), p. 492.
59. "Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament," April 22, 1930, U.S. Statutes at
Large, v. 46, p. 2858, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 31, p. 881.
60. "Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of
London of April 22, 1930," Nov. 6, 1936, AmericanJournal of International Law (Supp.), v. 31, p. 137 (1937),
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 31, p. 883.
61. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, Germany:
International Military Tribunal, 1948), v. 22, pp. 556-61.
62. The case of the British auxiliary cruiser Baralong in 1916 illustrates the public outrage of that country
at Germany's indiscriminate submarine warfare. Su, [1916] British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No.1
[Cd. 8144], reprinted in American Journal of International Law (Supp.), v. 10, pp. 79-86 (1916). Catching the
officers and crew of a German U-boat in the act of sinking a British merchant ship, the captain of the
Baralong ordered their summary execution on the spot. On the: German Government's demand that the
British Government prosecute the 1atter's commander and her ship's company for murder and punish them
according to the law of war, the British Government, without admitting the facts, justified the executions
as retaliation against the ruthlessness of Germany's U-boat policy of unrestricted sinking of merchant
ships. On the other side of the coin, see the German condemnation of the British policy of arming
merchantmen and instructing them, as a last resort, to ram U-boats, even if signalled to stop and submit
to visitation. This escalation of outrage culminated in Germany's conviction and execution, in July 1916,
of Captain Fryatt, the commander of the merchant ship Brussels for having attempted, in March 1915,
to ram the German submarine U-33. See Lautetpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 1, v. 2, p. 468, where Germany's
act was stigmatized as "nothing else than a judicial murder." See also James Brown Scott, "The Execution
of Captain Fryatt," American Journal of International Law, v. 10, p. 865 (1916). In his article, Scott, a leading
American international lawyer and Editor of the Journal at a time when the United States was still a neutral,
stated categorically:
Ramming is an effective method of defense against a submarine and the fact that a submarine is
a frail thing and cannot stand this kind of warfare is its misfortune, not the merchantman's fault.••.

IJ., p. 877. Scott concluded his Editorial Comment with the following statement:
If the views above expressed are correct that there is nothing in the law nor in the practice
of nations which prevents a belligerent merchant vessel from defending itself from attack and
capture, the execution of Captain Fryatt appears to have been without warrant in international
law and illegal, whatever it may have been according to the municipal ordinances of Germany.

IJ. See also "The Brussels: Captain Fryatt's Case," Pitt Cobbett, Leading Cases in International Law, Walker
5th ed. (1937), v. 2, p. 131 [hereinafter Pitt Cobbett]. The author commented:
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Gennany seems to have been the first nation to question either the right of active self-defense
or the legitimacy of defensively anned merchant ships. Practice appears to have been wholly against
her contentions. With regard to war on land, however, different considerations apply.

u., p. 132. This last distinction was made because the Gennan Government justified Captain Fryatt's
execution on the ground that he was a franc tireur, that is, a .civilian non-member of any fighting force
who, without orders, snipes from behind cover at his unsuspecting enemy. Pitt Cobbett pointed out that
the justification of making the franc tireur liable to "the severest treatment" has solid military reasons.
"The essence of the franc tireur is not his commission of hostilities, but the element of treachery-he
is a civilian one moment, a soldier the next. Having, as a peaceful civilian, watched the enemy soldiers
pass, he then snipes at them from his cottage window." Pitt Cobbett finally contrasted the franc tireur
with Captain Fryatt by pointing out that the franc tireur is under no fonn of discipline; there is no official
superior to whom appeal can be made should he fail to observe the usages of war. Captain Fryatt, on
the other hand, "though not a member of the anned forces of the Crown, was the head of a disciplined
body of men, and was ... acting under the advice of the British Admiralty." U. In fact, it should be
pointed out that Gennany, perhaps not incorrectly, had, in both World Wars, insisted on treating the
British Merchant Marine as a naval auxiliary service, since those ships travelled in convoys under anned
escorts, were defensively anned and, whether travelling in convoy or not, or defensively anned or not,
were required by the British Admiralty to take active measures of self-defense if attacked, to radio the
position of any Gennan U-boat seen by them, and to give the position of any observed underwater attack.
If Germany argued this characterization of British merchant ships as naval auxiliaries in order to approbate
their attacks on merchant ships, they should not have reprobated it in order to execute Captain Fryatt,
whom they punished for being a civilian sniper, not a unifonned member of the auxiliary service.
63. For a comment on both the limited size of the area and the Gennan maritime activity (invasion
and occupation of Norway), see Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I, v. 2, p. 493, note 1.
64. This was one of the notorious "Leipzig War Crimes Trials" held in Gennany in 1921. See American
Journal of Intemational Law (Supp.), v. 16, p. 708 (1922). See also Pitt Cobbett, supra note 62, v. 2, pp. 156,
158.
65. American Journal of International Law (Supp.), supra note 64, p. 722. This case should be contrasted
with the Dover Castle case, id., p. 704. The Dover Castle was also one of the Leipzig War Crimes cases.
The vessel was a British hospital ship. She was clearly marked as such and was carrying no military
personnel, munitions, or stores other than sick and wounded soldiers, members of the medical corps, and
necessary supplies connected with that service. The accused commander of the submarine, Karl Neumann,
was acquitted because the Dover Castle was sunk "in obedience to a service order of his highest superiors."
U., p. 708. It should be noted that his latter case was distinguished from the Llandovery Castle also on the
ground that the commander did not, as did Patzig, order the massacre of the survivors in lifeboats, or
those on, or clinging to, rafts and wreckage, and in the water. See Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note I,
v. 2, p. 569. On the Gennan Government's and High Command's policy, and order, of sinking hospital
ships on sight, see id., pp. 504-06, note 1. See also the British refusal to recognize the immunity of Gennan
seaplane ambulances in the English channel rescuing Gennan ainnen. U. pp. 506-07.
66. The defenses of the "Laconia Order" (superior order commanding the killing of survivors of
torpedoed ships) and of necessity were rejected. See Law Report of Trials of War Criminals (London: British
Military Court, 1945), v. I, p. 1 [hereinafter cited as War Crimes Reports].
67. War Crimes Reports, supra note 66, v. 9, p. 75. This case also involved the "Laconia Order."
68. U., v. 9, p. 82.
69. See Tucker, supra note 26, p. 72, note 55, where the author writes:
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Power]:
When France was threatened by a plague ofprotesting yachts (which largely failed to materialize)
the theoretical problem was deliberately made actual. Eventually, in 1973, France's notice to
mariners went beyond declaring a zone Jangereuse and for the first time in the history of nuclear
testing amounted to a temporary appropriation of an area of the high seas from which all shipping
could be excluded. One yacht was, in fact, boarded; but to hustle away H.M.N.Z.S. Taranoki or
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109. Clausewitz always saw "absolute war" as being subject to "three modifying factors;" but he defined
it for heuristic purposes as embodied in a contest that can "spring up quite suddenly and spread to the
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